(1.) BOTH these appeals seek to quash and set aside a common judgment and order passed in writ Petition No. 462 of 1995 and Writ Petition no. 695 of 1996 decided by a learned single judge on April 13, 1999.
(2.) THE brief relevant facts of the case are as under:
(3.) THE main contention pressed on behalf of the appellant was that the appellant was a qualified legal person. The principal nature of his duties, work and functions were to advice the management of the company. This work required knowledge of law, techniques of interpretation, creativity in formulating legal opinions and views in matters arising out of the affairs of the company for onward submission to the management for its consideration. In view of these functions and duties which were his main work, the petitioner must be said to be employed to do "technical work" within the meaning of the first part of Section 2 (s) of the industrial Disputes Act, 1947. In this regard it was further contended that insofar as the reference to the Labour Court was made in the year 1985 [after Section 2 (s) of the Industrial disputes Act was amended in 1984 delinking the words "skilled" and "unskilled" from the word Manual and by adding the word "operational"] the nature of the work done by the appellant must be judged under the amended provisions of Section 2 (s) of the Industrial disputes Act, 1947. It was therefore, contended that the appellant would also become a workman because the nature of his work could also be said to be "skilled and/or operational". It was further contended that in any case the nature of the work done by the appellant could not be said to be "mainly in the managerial or administrative Capacity" as the management was not duty bound to accept his opinions or advice and could discard the same. That he had no powers associated with management such as appointment, sanctioning of leave or dismissal of employees. That therefore, the learned single Judge had erred in applying exemption-Ill in the 2nd part of the definition of the workmen under Section 2 (s)of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It was therefore submitted that impugned Judgment and order passed by the learned single Judge was erroneous in law and deserved to be quashed and set aside.