BHAU ANNA PATIL Vs. DHONDIBAI BHIMA NHAVI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS writ petition under art. 227 of the Constitution of India takes exception to the judgment and order passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Bombay, Camp at Kolhapur, dated 8/12/1989 in Revision Application No. MRT-KP-45/1986.

(2.) THE land in question is situated at village Vasagade, taluka Karvir, district Kolhapur, bearing Survey Nos. 37 (2b), 38 (2b) and 38 (6b), totally admeasuring 0. 27 Ares only. The respondent is the landlady, whereas the petitioner is the tenant. The land was leased for sugarcane cultivation. The landlady filed application under s. 43b for fixation of reasonable rent for the year 1972-73, which was decided by fixing the reasonable rent at Rs. 490/- per annum. Later on, the petitioner tenant filed application under s. 43a (i) (b) read with Notifications dated 14/02/1958, as amended on 8/10/1969, for purchasing the suit land. That application was filed on 16/11/1973. It appears from the record that the said application was allowed by the first authority on 31/07/1974, and purchase price of Rs. 4. 900/- was fixed to be paid by the petitioner in respect of the suit land. It appears that the said decision became final with the decision of the Revisional Court on 6/04/1979. After ilie decision, the Petitioner has already paid purchase price, for which reason certificate has been issued on 5/06/1980 mentioning that the petitioner has become owner of the suit land. At the same time, when the above proceedings were in progress, the respondent landlady had filed application on 26/12/1978 under s. 25 read with s. 14 of the Act for possession of the suit land, on the ground that the petitioner-tenant was persistent defaulter for more than 3 years from 1972-73 till the filing of the application on 12/12/1978. The application also asserts that after every default committed by the petitioner, the landlady had given intimation to the petitioner as required under s. 25 of the Act. Be that as it may, the said proceedings were decided for the first time by the tenancy authority on 29/06/1981. The tenancy authority, however, did not grant the prayer for possession, but only directed the Petitioner tenant to pay the amount towards the arrears of rent. Against that decision, appeal was preferred by the respondent, which was also dismissed on 27/01/1986. Eventually, the respondent carried the matter in revision before the Tribunal, which has allowed by the impugned judgment and order and ordered restoration of possession of the suit lands to the respondent.

(3.) MR. Rege for the petitioners contends that the revisional authority has completely misdirected itself in allowing the revision application, much less in ordering restoration of possession. He submits that it is a matter of record that the petitioner had initiated proceedings for purchase of suit lands as back as on 16/11/1973 which application was allowed on 31/07/1974. It is also a matter of record, contends Mr. Rege, that the said order has become final on 6/04/1979 and pursuant to which the Petitioners paid the purchase price and obtained certificate from the competent authority on 5/06/1980. According to Mr. Rege, with issuance of certificate on 5/06/1980, the tenants have become owners of the suit lands and, in which case, the action initiated by the Respondent landlady for possession of the suit lands on the ground of default for the earlier period cannot be proceeded further, as it is well-settled that if the tenancy is determined by the landlord with issuance of notice, the tenant would continue to occupy the lands as his estate in possession and it is only after the order of dispsosession is passed by the competent authority, that he would become unauthorised occupant. It is, therefore, submitted that since the tenant has already been declared as owner of the suit lands, in any case of the suit lands on the ground of default for the earlier period cannot be proceeded further, as it is well-settled that if the tenancy is determined by the landlord with issuance of notice, the tenant would continue to occupy the lands as his estate in possession and it is only after the order of dispossession is passed by the competent authority, that he would become unauthorised occupant. It is, therefore, submitted that since the tenant has already been declared as owner of the suit lands, in any case on 5/06/1980 with issuance of certificate, after that date, the authority cannot proceed to dispossess the tenant on the ground that he had committed default for the earlier period. Reliance is placed on the decision of Division Bench of this Court in Namdeo Vishnu Joshiv. Raghunath Ganu Kadam,