PRAVINKUMAR R SALIAN Vs. HONBLE CHIEF MINISTER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) HEARD the learned Advocates for the petitioner and the respondent nos. 1, 2, 3 and 6, 14 and 15. None present for the remaining respondents, though served. Perused the records.

(2.) THE petitioner challenges the order dated 6th August, 2002 issued by the respondent No. 2 and the order and notice dated 7th August, 2002 issued by the respondent No. 3 on two counts. Firstly that, the respondent no. 2 was entitled neither under s. 79 of the Maharashtra Co-operative societies Act, 1960, hereinafter called as "the said Act", nor under any of the provisions of the said Act or Rules framed thereunder to pass such an order nor to give directions which were given thereunder, and likewise the respondent No. 3 could not have issued the order and notice dated 7th august, 2002 either under any of the statutory provisions of even under the by-laws of the society. Secondly that, the action on the part of the respondent No. 3 is clearly mala fide inasmuch as that the same is without application of mind and solely pursuant to the directions by the respondent no. 2 in that regard and further it discloses vindictiveness on the part of the respondent No. 3 consequent to the notice which was issued by the petitioner under the directions of the Board of Directors of the Society.

(3.) PLACING reliance in the decision of the Apex Court in the matter of steel Authority of India, Successor of Bokaro Steel Limited v. Presiding Officer, labour Court at Bokaro Steel City, Dhanbad, and Anr. , the learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted that plain reading of the order dated 6th august, 2002 would disclose that the respondent No. 2 could not have issued any such direction under any of the provisions of law contained either in the said Act or in the Rules made thereunder, and for the same reason the respondent No. 3 could not have proceeded to take action against the petitioner in the manner it was sought to be taken in the order/notice dated 7th August, 2002. He has further submitted that the By-laws of the society clearly require the Board of Directors to be the appointing or disciplinary Authority and, therefore, the Chairman of Board of Directors alone had no authority to initiate either disciplinary proceedings or to issue suspension order against the petitioner. It is his further contention that the action of suspension as well as initiation of disciplinary proceedings were solely pursuant to the said directions, and the same clearly reveals to be mala fide and that the respondent No. 3 had acted in vengeance on account of the petitioner having issued notice to the said respondent in terms of the direction given to the petitioner by the Board of Directors. It is his further contention that the allegation in the notice dated 7th August, 2002 nowhere discloses misconduct of serious nature so as to warrant suspension of the petitioner. Reliance is also sought to be placed in the decision of the Division bench of this Court in the matter of Khandesh Roller Flour Mills, through its partner Mrs. Sheelaw/o. Kantilal Singhiv. State of Maharashtra and Anr. ,. On the other hand, relying upon the decisions in the matter of Hindustan Steels ltd. Rourkela v. Roy (A. K.) and Ors. , and The Shamrao Vithal Co-operative bank Limited and Anr. v. Padubidri Pattabhiram Bhat and Anr. , it is sought to be contended on behalf of the respondents that though the order of suspension was issued pursuant to the directions by the respondent No. 2, the order to initiate disciplinary proceedings was not on account of any such direction but on account of misconduct on the part of the petitioner, and in that regard, the attention was also drawn to the notice dated 12th april, 2002 which was issued to the petitioner much prior to the order dated 6th August, 2002. It was further contended that the so-called directions under s. 79 of the said Act by the order dated 6th August, 2002 were mere intimation by a Statutory Authority which is duty-bound to supervise the functioning of the co-operative societies. It was also submitted that the decision on the part of the respondent No. 3 was ratified by the Board of directors and this fact was clearly stated in the affidavit-in-reply and was not disputed or denied by filing any counter-affidavit in that regard. It was further contended that the respondent No. 14 is not a State within the meaning of the said expression under Art. 12 of the Constitution of India, and, therefore, there is no case made out by the petitioner to issue a writ against a private party. Merely by alleging that the disciplinary action has been taken pursuant to the direction by the respondent No. 2, the petitioner cannot seek relief from this Court in writ jurisdiction when the records apparently disclose that the action pertaining to the proceedings for disciplinary action was not pursuant to the direction by the Statutory authority but on account of misconduct on the part of the petitioner and the society enjoys the ample powers to punish the petitioner for such misconduct.