KALIBAI KANA PATIL Vs. USHA GOPAL HIRANANDANI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India takes exception to the judgment and order dated January 4, 1990, in revision being No. TEN. A. 165 of 1989 passed by the maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Bombay.

(2.) THE lands in question are five pieces of agricultural lands bearing Gut No. 882 at village Wadhiv and Gut Nos. 547, 902, 891 and 416 at village Saravali, in taluka Palghar, district Thane. The Petitioner was cultivating the suit lands prior to 1st April 1957 in the capacity as tenant. At the relevant time, the owner of the suit lands, namely, the predecessor of the Respondent, Laxmibai Narayan Hate, being widow on the tillers' day, the tillers' day stood postponed by virtue of section 32f of the Bombay tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act. The predecessor of the Respondent, however, died on 15th July 1980. After the death of the said laxmibai, the Respondent has inherited the suit lands as owner, being the legal representative of the deceased landlady. The Petitioner, however, filed application under section 326 of the Act for fixation of purchase price on the assumption that he has become deemed purchaser. That application was filed some time in 1985. The said application was, however, rejected on 24th july 1986, on the ground that the Petitioner failed to exercise his option within the meaning of section 32f (1) (a) of the Act within the statutory period, on account of which the purchase has become ineffective. That decision has been allowed to become final, which fact is not disputed. It is on that basis the Respondent preferred subject application on 16th September 1987, which proceedings were treated to be one under section 32p of the Act for possession of the suit lands. That application was allowed by the first authority on May 25, 1988, on the reasoning that the Petitioner having failed to exercise his right to purchase, the purchase has become ineffective and the order as passed by the tenancy authority in the earlier proceedings has become final and would bind the parties. Against this decision and order of possession, the petitioner carried the matter in appeal. The appellate authority allowed the appeal preferred by the Petitioner and chose to remand the proceedings to the first authority to re-examine the entire matter afresh. The appellate authority has set aside not only the order passed on the subject application, but also the order passed in the earlier proceedings under section 326 dated 24th July 1986, which had already attained finality. This decision was challenged by the Respondent before the Maharashtra Revenue tribunal. The Tribunal, by the impugned judgment and order, has set aside the order of the appellate authority holding that the appellate authority has clearly exceeded its jurisdiction. It has been found that since the decision in section 32g proceedings dated 24th July 1986 had become final and remained unchallenged, the question of setting aside that order so as to relegate the parties, was obviously not subject matter for consideration in the appeal. It further found that since it is undisputed that the order dated 24th July 1986 remained unchallenged, the question of entertaining the claim of the Petitioner will not arise) but the purchase having become ineffective, the consequences under section 32p would follow and, therefore, the order, as passed by the first authority, on 25th May 1. 988 came to be restored. The Tribunal accordingly allowed the revision preferred by the Respondent and restored the order passed by the Tahsildar by the impugned judgment and order dated 4th January 1990.

(3.) MR. Railkar, for the Petitioner, contends that the application as filed ought to have been dismissed on the ground that the same was barred by limitation and, in any case, because it was not preferred within reasonable time. He submits that it is well settled that in sever as the proceedings under section 84 (c) of the Act are concerned, where no provision is made for limitation to initiate those proceedings, it is consistently held that that would mean that the proceedings should be initiated within reasonable time. He submits that the same principle be applied to the proceedings under section 32p of the Act, as the language employed in section 32p is virtually the same as is employed in section 84 (c) of the Act. He further contends that the Respondent in the application has clearly asserted that the possession of the suit lands be made over to her for personal and bona fide cultivation; and if that is so, the application was essentially one under section 31 of the Act and the same is not within limitation.