STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AT THE INSTANCE OF SHRI NATRAJAN PROVIDENT FUND INSPECTOR BOMBAY Vs. SHIVPRAKASH SETH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE State of Maharashtra has perferred this appeal for enhancement of the sentence of simple imprisonment for one week and fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default, simple imprisonment for one month each imposed on the Directors of the Simplex woollen Mills Ltd. under section 14-A of the Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952. The short point raised in the appeal is that admittedly the accused, who were Directors of the Mills, had pleaded guilty to certain breaches of the provisions of the Act on earlier occasions and that, consequently, the sentence imposed, which is below the minimum as prescribed by the Act, is in breach of the provisions of the law. It is pointed out that the Accused had pleaded guilty and that the learned Magistrate has obviously erred because he is precluded in law from having imposed any lesser sentences than the minimum of three months rigorous imprisonment as provided in the section. The companion appeals raise the same point, though the periods and the sentences awarded are slightly different. Since the issues involved are common, I propose to deal with all of them in this judgment, though for purpose of record, separate orders will be necessary.

(2.) SHRI Vashi, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, sought to canvass certain submissions with regard to the merits of the matter. He drew my attention to a decision of this Court in the case of (Mansinh L. Bhakta v. State of Maharashtra.) 1992 F. J. R. Vol. (80) Page 331, as also to a second decision of this Court in the case of (E. S. I. Corporation v. G. N. Mathur) 1992 F. J. R. Vol. (80) Page 343; and thirdly, to the decision in the case of (Tot. Corp. of India v. R. M. Gandhi) 1992 F. L. R. Vol. (64) page 697. He canvassed certain arguments with regard to the aspect of the legal liability of the Directors, but I have refrained from examining that aspect of the matter because to my mind, once a plea of guilt has been recorded. It would not be permissible to go behind that plea. Secondly, the cases in question dealt with certain aspects of the liability that can be foisted on directors of limited companies with regard to situations that were prevalent in those cases. I do not consider it necessary to go into that aspect of the matter because it is for the prosecuting authority to consider these questions in the view that this Court finds it necessary to take.

(3.) SHRI Vashi submitted that the practice of accepting a plea of guilt before the trial Court in relation to situations where the accused will be visited with a minimum jail sentence or a minimum fine which is relatively heavy must be disapproved of. He submitted that the origin of this system is obviously rooted in the concept of Plea-bargaining and that even if it may be permissible as regards petty or trivial offences where liabilities are serious and where the statute prescribe a minimum sentence, it is improper on the part of the trial Court to rush through with the case and to dispose it off in such a slipshod fashion. Shri Vashi has relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of ( Kasambhai Sk. v. State of Gujarat.) A. I. R. 1980 S. C. 854, wherein a situation arose under the provisions of the Prevention to Food Adulteration Act, 1954 that an accused having pleaded guilty before the trial Court faced the prospect of enhancement of the sentence because the law provided for a minimum of three months rigorous imprisonment. The Supreme Court had occasion to observe that this procedure ought not to be followed set aside the order of the High Court and remanded the matter to the trial Court for disposal on merits. Along with this submission, Shri Vashi also contended that these are not cases which can answer to the definition of petty or trivial cases and that, consequently, it is improper to try these cases summarily under Chapter XXI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.