DEO BHARGAVARAM PEDHE PARSHARAM Vs. RAJARAM SHANKAR GANPULE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THESE two matters, the First Appeal and the Writ Petition, can be disposed of together by this common judgment. In First Appeal No. 470 of 1977 the question relates to the apportionment of the compensation under the Land Acquisition Act and hence, a reference under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act was made. The appellant Deosthan is a registered Public Trust viz. Deo Bhargavaram Pedhe Parsharam, which was claimant No. 1 before the learned Civil Judge, Chiplun, and claims to be the owner of the properties acquired under the award, dated 31st July, 1975. Claimants Nos. 2, 6, 7 and 8 also claim title to the said lands situate at village Pedhe Parsharam. The details of the lands and the compensation determined has been mentioned in Para 8 of the impugned Judgment, dated 31.1.1977. Under the said Judgment, it has been held that original Claimant Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 were entitled to receive Rs. 646.87, Rs. 327.73, Rs. 24.15, Rs. 36.25, Rs. 2555.55, Rs. 271.22 and Rs. 164.34 respectively out of the amount of Rs. 4026.11 which was lying in the Court. Claimant No. 6 was directed to pay Rs. 83.20 to Claimant No. 1 out of the amount of Rs. 2555.55. The claimants were directed to produce no due certificate from the B.D.O., Chiplun, and the Chairman of the Chiplun Vividha Vikas Karyakari Society at the time of the receipt of the compensation from the Court. Original Claimant No. 1 has challenged the said order in this First Appeal.

(2.) I have heard Shri Dalvi for the Appellant Deosthan and Shri Kanade for present Respondent's Nos. 5 -A to 5 -E. The question revolves mainly around interpretation of the original Sanad, Exh. 35, dated 9th September, 1864. Relying upon the said Sanad and the observations of this Court in certain reported decisions, to which a reference is made in Para 6 of the impugned Judgment, the learned Judge has held that the Sanad, Exh. 35, was not the title deed and no title could pass to the appellant in respect of the suit lands under the said Sanad, Exh. 35. Hence, the learned trial Judge found that the Appellant Deosthan was not entitled to receive the amount of compensation exclusively as per the award given by the Land Acquisition Officer. By a somewhat queer logic the learned trial Judge has held that original Claimants Nos. 2 to 8 would, however, be entitled to receive certain specified amounts of compensation.

(3.) IN support of the application for additional evidence, Shri Dalvi has invited my attention to the provisions of Sub -clause (b) of Clause (1) of Rule 27 of Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure. It deals with the production of additional evidence in Appeal and provides that the parties in Appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the Appellate Court. But if the Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause, the Appellate Court may allow such evidence or document to be produced or witness to be examined. Shri Dalvi has also invited my attention to the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of K. Venkataramiah v. A. Seetharama Reddy and Ors. : [1964]2SCR35 . In particular, he has invited my attention to the following observations which appear in para 16 of page 1530 of the Report: The requirement, it has to be remembered, was the requirement of the High Court, and it will not be right, for us to examine the evidence to find out whether we would have required such additional evidence to enable 'us' to pronounce judgment. Apart from this it is well to remember that the Appellate Court has the power to allow additional evidence not only if it requires such evidence 'to enable it to pronounce judgment' but also for 'any other substantial cause'. There may well be cases where even though the Court finds that it is able to pronounce judgment on the state of the record as it is, and so, it cannot strictly say that it requires additional evidence 'to enable it to pronounce judgment', it still considers that in the interest of justice something which remains obscure should be filled up so that it can pronounce it judgment in a more satisfactory manner. (Emphasis supplied)