ANANDJI MEGHJI Vs. SHRINIVAS TABURA SHETTY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) A rather unusual dimension relating to the invocation of the High Courts powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is involved in this and the companion petitions, all of which constitute one group. Whereas the petitioner contends that interference from this Court is essential for the purpose of ensuring that the respondents do not use the laws delays involved in disposal of proceedings to their unfair advantages and thereby frustrate what he is legally and lawfully entitled to do, the opposite parties argue that Article 227 of the Constitution cannot be invoked, circumstances regardless, for mere expedition of the suits. The facts are rather telling, and on hearing the parties, it did appear that this was one of the perhaps rare situations where interference would be justified.

(2.) FIRST the facts. The entire set of suits is pending before the Court of Small Causes at Bombay. The petitioner is the owner of Baithi Chawl, situated at Lalbaug in Bombay, which happens to be a very congested part of the city wherein a large number of relatively old and rather dilapidated buildings are in existence. The respondents are the tenants of the structures in question and are apparently running several shops therein. It is pointed out, and with considerable justification, that the adjoining road in question is a 44 feet wide road and that as per the original development plan, the road was to be widened to 90 feet as a result of which the entire chawl and the rear compulsory vacant space would have been fully affected. Realising that this would involve loss of premises to all the tenants as also to the petitioner-landlord, representations were made to the authorities to kindly consider a reasonable modification bearing in mind the additional road requirement. The petitioner was instrumental in ensuring that the width of the road would be reduced to 60 feet as a result whereof, it was possible to demolish the existing building and replace it by a more stable modern building, which would be more compact. Having succeeded in getting this modification done, which was principally on the petitioners assurance to the authorities that he would remove the existing structures and replace them by a new one, the petitioner submitted the plans for sanction in respect of the new building, which have been duly sanctioned by the Bombay Municipal Corporation. The petitioner thereafter obtained a certificate contemplated under section 13 (3-A) of the Bombay Rent Act and has also given the undertaking as required by law. It is the case of the petitioner that, having regard to these factors, he would have been normally justified in demolishing the building and that he is under no obligation to provide a fresh accommodation to the tenants. Instead of adopting a strictly legalistic attitude, the petitioner requested the tenants to co-operate with him and to permit the demolition of half the building at a time, so that a new structure could come up there and the petitioner also agreed to shift the tenants in the new structure. The Petitioner also agreed to provide transit accommodation whenever the same became necessary.

(3.) IT appears from the petition that the respondents-tenants, as often happens, obviously decided to drive a hard bargain and started acting difficult; whereas a small number of them agreed to the proposal the remaining tenants faltly refused to co-operate. Left with no option, the petitioner-landlord was required to file the entire set of suits against the tenants praying for appropriate reliefs. The petitioner was faced with a dual problem, the first of them being the fact that he was required to commence the construction of a new structure which was not possible by virtue of the adamant and non-coperative behaviour of the respondents-tenants and thereby forcing him to apply for revalidations of the approved plans from time to time and at the same time being unable to honour his commitments to the Bombay Municipal Corporation that the set back area would be handed over to the Corporation so that road widening process could be undertaken. The petitioner applied to the Court of Small Causes for immediate disposal of the suits wherein he pointed out that, having regard to the nature of the facts, the scope for contest was minimal and that in the aforesaid circumstances, there was sufficient ground made out for the proceedings to be taken up for hearing out of turn. The learned trial Judge upheld the contentions, but, in view of the fact that there are a large number of cases pending in that Court, he directed that these suits would be taken up for hearing after the 1985 suits. The petitioner thereupon moved this Court by way of the present group of petitions and contended that on the special facts of this cases, sufficient ground exists to direct the trial Court to take up the proceedings forthwith and to dispose them of.