(1.) Arising for determination in this appeal by the original plaintiffs is a question of some importance under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter the Act).
(2.) Since the year 1950 or so the defendant (respondent) herein has been plaintiffs tenant of room No. 18 on the first floor of a building known as Morarji Gokuldas Deoji Trust Building situated at Kennedy Bridge in the City of Bombay. In or about October 1968, the defendant purchased a car which he commenced parking in the open space of the compound of the said building. The plaintiffs objected. As many as three notices were issued to remove the car from the said compound and cease packing it there. The defendant did not comply nor did he reply to any of these notices. The plaintiffs thereupon filed the instant suit for a declaration that the defendant, by parking his car in the compound, was committing trespass and for permanent injunction restraining him from doing so. The defendant raised two defences viz., (a) he was parking the car under express permission from one of the trustees; and (b) in any event, he had, under the Act, a statutory right to do so. The trial Court negatived both these defences, held the defendants action to constitute a trespass and decreed the suit.
(3.) The defendant appealed to this Court. At the hearing, the trial Courts finding that the defendant had failed to prove permission to park was not challenged. The learned Single Judge hearing the appeal, however, held that the ground floor one space in the compound of the building was "appurtenant" to the leased room on the first floor within the meaning of section 5(8)(b) of the Act and, therefore, "premises" as defined therein. It was also held that parking car was an essential service within the meaning of section 24(1) of the Act and the plaintiffs, therefore, cannot cut off or withhold the same. The defendant was consequently held to have a statutory right to park his car without any permission from the plaintiffs. The appeal was thus allowed, the trial Courts decree was set aside and the suit dismissed. Hence, this appeal therefrom under the Letters Patent.