KARBHARI Vs. ANJANABAI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) A short question involved in this writ-petition is as to whether the appeal filed by the petitioner before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal at Aurangabad was within the period of limitation. Sub-section (1) of section 6 of the Maharashtra Restoration of Lands to Scheduled Tribes Act, 1974, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Restoration Act'), provides that an appeal against any decision or order passed by the Collector may, notwithstanding anything contained In the Code, be made to Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal constituted under the Code. Sub-section (2) further provides that every such appeal shall be made within "a period of 60 days from the date receipt of the decision or order" passed by the Collector and the provisions of sections 4, 5, 12 and 14 of the Limitation Act shall apply to the filing of such appeal. The respondents nos. 1 and 2 filed an application under section 3 of the Restoration Act in respect of lands survey no. 49/2 and 50/3 situated at village Mahegaon, Taluq Kannad, district Aurangabad. On enquiry, that application was granted by the learned Tahsildar by Judgment and order dated April 17, 1978. Feeling aggrieved by the said Judgment and order passed by the Tahsildar, the petitioner filed an appeal before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal which was allowed on the ground that the Tahsildar had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. It appears that the Special Officer on duty filed a review petition pointing out that the Tahsildar had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. Therefore, that review petition was granted on August 10, 1979. It appears that on the merits the appeal was allowed on the same day and the matter was remanded to the Tahsildar. After remand, the learned Tahsildar heard the parties and granted the original application made by the respondents nos. 1 and 2 by Judgment and order dated July 5, 1980 wherein the Tahsildar directed restoration of lands survey no. 49/2 and 51/1. It appears that the petitioner, feeling aggrieved by the said Judgment and order passed by the learned Thasildar dated July 5, 1980, presented an appeal before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal on August 3, 1981. It was contended by the petitioner that there was some mutation entry at the hands of Talathi in respect of the said lands and he came to know of the Judgment and order passed by the learned Tahsildar on 29-7-81 from Talathi and it is, therefore, from the date of knowledge of order, the filing of appeal should be treated as within time. After hearing the parties, the learned Member of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, by Judgment and order dated January 14, 1982 held that the appeal was barred by limitation and there was no explanation given by the petitioner to condone the delay. It is this order which Is challenged by the petitioner under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in this writ petition.

(2.) Mr. S. C. Bora, the learned counsel appearing in support of the petition, submitted that the learned Member of the Tribunal had committed an error in construing the provisions of section 6 of the Restoration Act. Mr. Bora submitted a certified copy of a letter addressed to the respondent No. l.Anjanabai Eknath intimating her that her application was granted by the Court. Below that there is a noting that a copy of the said intimation is sent to the petitioner. The said letter is signed by an Officer on July 4, 1981. Relying upon this letter, Mr. Bora argued that the intimation of the decision was communicated to him on 4-7-1981 and, therefore, from that date the appeal is within the period of limitation.

(3.) Mr. D. V. Bhonsle, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents nos. 1 and 2, submitted that the petitioner has not produced in this Court the receipt of such letter but merely relying upon a certified copy of the intimation given by the Tahsildar and such an explanation should not be accepted to be true. Secndly it is argued by Mr. Bhonsle that subsection (2) of section 6 of the Restoration Act should be construed very liberally. The words "a period of 60 days from the date of the receipt of the decicibn" should be construed to mean that if the litigant is present in the Court and the Judgment is delivered in the open Court, it should be deemed to have been received by the litigant. The said sub-section (2) does not contemplate supply of a copy of Judgment without any payment of requisite chargls for costs thereof. It is further urged by Mr. Bhonsle that the date of Judgment was fixed by the learned Tahsildar and accordingly the Judgment has been delivered on the appointed date. The party aggrieved should be deemed to have a knowledge of such Judgment. It is in this context the contention of the petitioner that he had a knowledge of the decision from Talatii on July 29, 1981 should be treated as false and concoction only.