MAHDUKAR VISHRAM SAWANT Vs. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) [His Lordship, after dealing with facts and points of law not material to this report, proceeded.] This takes us on to the last point raised by Mr. Rele who submitted that the award of sentences under both the counts was bad in law. In a nutshell, his arguments, which were mainly founded on Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, were to the effect that a man cannot be punished twice for the same offence. In support of his submission, my attention was drawn to the rulings in Lohana Kantilal v. State AIR[1954] Sau. 121 and In re P.S. Aravamudha AIR[1960] Mad. 27. In both these cases the view taken seems to be that offences falling under Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 5(1)(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act are the same and, therefore, Section 26 of the General Clauses Act would be a bar for awarding separate sentences. It was observed (at p. 32) by Ramaswami J. in In re P.S. Aravamudha's case, referred to above, that. The essential ingredients of the offence under Section 5(1)(a) are the same as the ingredients of the offence under Section 161, I.P.C. subject to one difference, viz., that the offence under Section 5(1)(a) is an aggravated form of the offence under Section 161, I.P.C, Repetition of the offence under Section 101, I.P.C. would amount to the offence of criminal misconduct under Section 5(1)(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. It follows, therefore, that the charge framed against the accused that he committed the offence under Section 5(1)(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act necessarily implies that he had committed the offence punishable under Section 161, I.P.C.

(2.) PROCEEDING further and referring to Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, the learned Judge observes that separate sentences are illegal since there is only one act which constitutes an offence under the two enactments. With respect, I am unable to share these views.

(3.) THERE would be one more aspect of this question which has been considered in Om Parkash v. State of U.P. : 1957CriLJ575 and M.P. State v. Veereshwar Rao : 1957CriLJ892 . In the first case i.e. Om Parkash's case, on tracing the history of the legislation of the new enactment, their Lordships have pointed out that: The Prevention of Corruption Act being a temporary one, the legislature would not have intended in the normal course of things that a temporary statute like that should supersede an enactment of antiquity, viz. the Penal Code, even if the matter covered the same field. Under Section 6(a) of the General Clauses Act if by efflux of time, the period of a temporary statute which had repealed an earlier statute expires, there would not be a revival of the earlier one by the expiry of the temporary statute. Their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 405, Indian Penal Code, vis -a -vis Section 5(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and pointed out that 'a clear comparison and contrast of the different elements constituting the two offences would show that tho offence under Section 405 I.P.C. is separate and distinct from the one under Section 5(1)(c).' Similarly, in Veereshwar's, their Lordships were dealing with an offence punishable under Section 409, Indian Penal Code and it was pointed out that the offence of criminal misconduct punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act is not identical in essence or in import and content with an offence under Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code. The offence of criminal misconduct defined by Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is a now offence created by that enactment and it does not repeal, by implication, or abrogate Section 409, Indian Penal Code. Those two authorities which make the position quite clear afford an adequate answer to the point raised by Mr. Rele, and, in my opinion, neither Section 26 of the General Clauses Act nor Article 20 of the Constitution of India would be a bar for two -fold punishments.