MULJI MANILAL KAMDAR Vs. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE facts giving rise to this Criminal revision application briefly are that the Income-tax Officer, Jamnagar, was holding proceedings under Section 23 of the Income-tax Act, 1922, in regard to the assessment of the income of me second respondent, hereinafter referred to as the respondent. During the course of those proceedings the income-tax Officer, Jamnagar, came to Bombay and examined the petitioner on oath. THE respondent's case is that the petitioner then made statement, which to the knowledge of the petitioner, were false. He, therefore, filed a complaint against the petitioner for an offence under Section 193 I.P.C., in the Court of Presidency Magistrate, 19th Court. An objection was raised to the maintainability of the complaint by the petitioner. It was contended by him that an Income-tax Officer is a Revenue Court within the meaning of Clause (b) in Sub-section (1) of Section 195 Criminal P.C. and that consequently the Court could not take cognizance of any offence under Section 193 I.P.C. alleged to have been committed by the petitioner in the course of proceedings before the Income-tax Officer, except on a complaint In writing by the Income-tax Officer or of some other authority to whom he was subordinate. This objection was overruled and the learned Magistrate rejected the application made by the petitioner, in which he had raised this preliminary objection. Against the order made by film the present application has been made.

(2.) THE question, which we have to determine, is whether an Income-tax Officer, while holding proceedings under Section 23 of the Indian Income-tax Act, is a Court within the meaning of Clause (b) in Sub-section (1) of Section 195 Criminal P.C. THE word "Court" is not defined in the Code. Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, defines "Court" as including alt Judges and Magistrates and all persons except arbitrators legally authorised to take evidence. This definition has been held to be not exhaustive but framed only for the purposes of the Evidence Act and is not to be extended beyond its legitimate scope; see Queen Empress v. Tulja, ILR 12 Bom 36, and Brajnandan Sinha v. Jyoti Narain, (1955) 2 SCR 955 at 961 : ((S) AIR 3956 SC 66 at p. 69). As pointed out by Fry, L.J. in Royal Aquarium and Summer and Winter Garden Society Ltd. v. Parkinson, (1892) 1 QB 431, there are many Courts which, though not Courts of Justice, are nevertheless Courts according to law. THE word "Court" does not, therefore, have a uniform meaning in all the enactments. THE question whether a particular tribunal is a Court must, therefore, be decided in each case having regard to the provisions of the enactment under which that tribunal is constituted.

(3.) IT seems to us that the principle underlying these two decisions will also apply to an Income-tax Officer holding assessment proceedings under Section 23 of the Income-tax Act 1922. In this connection, it is necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of this Act. Section 22 provides for the submission of returns of income by persons whose total income during the previous year exceeded the maximum amount, which is not chargeable to Income-tax. Sub-section (1) of Section 23 provides that if the Income-tax Officer is satisfied that a return made under Section 22 is correct and complete, he shall assess the total income of the assessee and shall return. Sub-section (2) states that if the Income-tax Officer is not satisfied without requiring the presence of the person who made the return or the production of evidence that a return made under Section 22 is correct and complete, he shall serve on such person a notice requiring him to attend the Income-lax Officer's office or to produce, or to cause to be there produced, any evidence on which such person may rely in support of the return. Sub-section (3) is in the following terms: