KALU Vs. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THESE are three petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution against the orders passed by the Additional District Magistrate, Surat, under Section 56, Bombay Police Act, directing three persons, Kalu alias Hussein Mahamad, Kadwa Nathu Bhil and Peerbhai alias Peerubhai Husseinbhai, to remove themselves outside the limits of the Surat District. The Addl. District Magistrate has passed three separate orders in regard to the three petitioners, but all the three petitions involve one question of law, which is common to them. The grounds upon which action has been taken are also similar, and similar objections have been taken with regard to them. It would be convenient, therefore, to dispose of all the petitions by one judgment.

(2.) THE first point, which is common to the three petitions is with regard to the authority of the learned Additional District Magistrate, who has passed the orders under Section 56, Bombay Police Act in all the three cases. Section 56, Bombay Police Act empowers only a District Magistrate or a Sub-Divisional Magistrate specially empowered by the State Government in that behalf to take action under that section. The Additional District Magistrate is not specifically mentioned in that section, but has purported to act under the authority conferred upon him by Government Resolution, Home Department, No. 1456/6 dated 21-4-1950, which empowers all Additional District Magistrates in the State of Bombay to exercise the powers of a District Magistrate under the Code of Criminal Procedure or under any other law for the lime being in force in the State of Bombay. It is contended on behalf of the petitioners, however, that this notification would not invest the Additional District Magistrate with powers of a District Magistrate under an Act, which admittedly was enacted after the date of the notification. It is not in dispute, and indeed it could not be disputed, that the notification which has been issued under the powers conferred upon the Government by Section 10, Criminal P. C. is exactly in the same terms as the Act. Sub-section (2) of that section says: "the State Government may appoint. . . . . . . . . an Additional Magistrate, and such Additional District Magistrate shall have al! or any of the powers of a District Magistrate under this Code, or under any other law for the time being in force, as the State Government may direct. " the words "for the time being in force," which qualify the word "law" in Section 10 (2), obviously have been put in there, with a view to enabling the Provincial Government to invest Additional District Magistrates with the powers of a District Magistrate, not only under the Code and any laws, which might have been in force at the time when the Code was enacted, but also under any laws, which may be passed after the enactment of Section 10 (2 ). When, therefore, the notification empowers Additional District Magistrates to exercise all the powers of a District Magistrate under the Code, or under any other law for the time being in force, it is obvious that the intention was that, provided only the powers were possessed by a District Magistrate at the time when they were to be exercised, the Additional District Magistrates will have those powers just as the District Magistrates had them. Mr. Patel, who appears on behalf of the petitioners, contends, however, that this notification is 'ultra vires'. He says that it is quite true that Section 10 (2) empowers the Provincial Government to invest the Additional District Magistrate with all or any of the powers of a District Magistrate; but he says that there is a limitation upon the powers of the Provincial Government, and that is, that they can invest the Additional District Magistrate with only such powers as the District Magistrate possessed, whether under the Code, or under any other law, which may be in force at the time when the notification investing the Additional District Magistrates with the powers of a District Magistrate is issued. The question consequently is, what are the powers of the Provincial Government under Section 10 (2 ).

(3.) IN the first instance, the words "for the time being in force" obviously qualify the word "law". The phrase "under any other law for the time being in force" goes with the word 'powers," which is the object of the verb "shall have. " The words "for the time being in force" can, therefore, be connected with the words "shall have. " It is obvious that when that expression is used, we have got to find out the point of time, with reference to which it has got to be decided as to whether the law, the powers under which are claimed by the Additional District Magistrate, is or is not in force. The contention on behalf of the petitioners is that the point of time with reference to which it has got to be decided as to whether the law is or is not in force is the time when the Provincial Government directs, i. e. , issues the notification. On the other hand, it is contended on behalf of the State of Bombay that the point of time, with reference to which it has got to be decided as to whether any law is or is not in force, is with reference to the time when it is contended that the Magistrate has or has not powers. Now, I have already mentioned that there can be no difficulty whatsoever with regard to connecting the words "for the time being in force" with the word "shall have. " As a matter of fact, the second sentence of Section 10 (2) is a compound sentence joined by the conjunction 'as,' and inasmuch, as the words "for the time being in force" occur in the first sentence, the words must have reference to something in that sentence. It is impossible to accept the contention that the words have got any reference to a verb which occurs in the subsequent sentence joined by 'as,' unless it could be shown that the words can be connected with it. Now, whenever a conjunction like 'as' connects two sentences, one principal and one subordinate, and the subordinate sentence follows, words have sometimes to be dropped from the subordinate sentence, with a view to avoiding repetition, and we have no doubt that in this case words have been dropped after the word 'direct'; and it is open to the petitioners to contend that if the words "for the time being in force" can be connected with the word "direct" by restoring to the subordinate sentence the words dropped, that should be done. But if we restore to the sentence connected by the conjunction 'as' the dropped words, what we get is "the Provincial Government may direct that such Magistrates shall have all or any of the powers of a District Magistrate under this Code, or under any other law for the time being in force. " The result of the restoration of the words is again to introduce into the second sentence the verb 'shall have,' in a subordinate sentence, the principal sentence ending with the verb "direct" and we do not get any better 'result by restoring the words. The words "for the time being in force" are again connected with the verb "shall have," and it is impossible to connect them with the word "direct," which again finds place in another sentence.