DHARWAR BANK LTD Vs. VASUDEORAO MADHAVRAO DESHPANDE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THESE are four applications for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. They arise out of the decisions of this Court in certain Letters Patent Appeals, namely, 45, 46, 47 and 48 of 1949. These Letters Patent Appeals arose out of the orders made in two Darkhasts Nos. 6 and 9 of 1947 in the Court of the Civil Judge (S. D.) Dharwar. Prom Darkhast No. 6 of 1947 the two First Appeals were F. A. Nos. 131 of 1948 and 505 of 1948 and from Darkhast No. 9 of 1947 the First Appeals were F. A. Nos. 130 of 1s48 and 507 of 1948. All these four appeals were disposed of by Mr. Justce Gajendragadkar and Letters Patent Appeals from the judgment of the learned Judge were disposed of by Mr. Justice Dixit and myself on 7-3-1951, by one common judgment. Letters Patent Appeals Nos. 48 and 46 of 1949 were from Darkhast No. 6 of 1947 and Letters Patent Appeals Nos. 45 and 47 of 1949 were in respect of Darkhast No. 9 of 1947. After these appeals were disposed of on 7-3-1951, the present applications for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court were filed on 1-8-1951. Rule was issued in all those four applications and the applications have now come up before us for final hearing.

(2.) THE main objection which has been taken by Mr. Datar for the opponents is that all the four applications are barred by limitation. . Under Art. 179 of the Limitation Act a person desiring to file an application under the Code of Civil Procedure to the Supreme Court for leave to appeal has to file such application within 90 days of the date of the decree appealed from. The period of 90 days therefore, begins to run from the date of the decree. Although the judgment of this Court was delivered on 7-3-1951, in all the four Letters Patent Appeals, the decree in all the four cases was drawn up on 4-4-1951. Therefore, although the period of 90 days has to be computed from the date of the decree, the period up to the drawing up of the decree has to be excluded which in effect means the period of 90 days must be calculated from the date of the signing of the decree. On that computation the application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court had to be filed on 3-7-1951. In fact the applications were filed on 2-8-1951. Therefore, it has been argued by Mr. Datar that the applications are barred by limitation.

(3.) MR. Murdeshwar has, however, contended that in making this computation, the period required for obtaining copies of the decrees should be excluded. What has happened in these cases is that on 2-8-1951, all the four applications for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court were presented. But only in C. A. 109 of 1952 a copy of the Judgment of this Court was produced. In all the four civil applications the copies of the decrees were ready with the learned advocate and were in fact produced in the office. We have ascertained from the office that they were in fact produced by the learned advocate but as Rule 187 of the rules of this Court on the Appel- late Side did not require the production of copies of any decrees, the office informed the learned advocate that they need not be produced, with the result that they were taken back by the learned advocate. The question is whether in these circumstances time required for obtaining copies of the decrees should be excluded or not.