GOPAL RAGHUNATH Vs. GOVIND PANDURANG

JUDGEMENT

(1.) An interesting question arises in this revision application as to whether the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act was in force on 27-5-1950, when opponent 1 filed a suit under the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act.

(2.) Now, in order to properly construe Section 56 it is necessary to have the background of the previous legislation. Under the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act, 1939, it was provided by Section 85 that the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act should cease to have force in such areas where the Board was established on the date when the Board was so established, but Section 86 of the Act kept the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act in force foe special purposes for three years from the date of the establishment of the Board. In this particular area with which we are dealing the Board was established on 1-51945. Therefore, under Section 85 the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act would cease to have force, but by reason of Section 86 it would continue to be in force up to 31.4-1948. Then the old Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act was repealed and the new Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act came into force on 27-5-1947, and the result of the repeal of the old Act was or would have been that the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act would no longer have been in force as provided in Section 86 of the old Act. Therefore, in this particular case on 27-5-1947, the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act would not have boon in force for the purpose of Section 86 of the old Act as on that date the new Act came into force. In order to get over that difficulty an amending Act was passed in 1948 which was Act 70 of 1948 and by that amendment Section 56 (1) was made to run as follows :

(3.) Now lot us see what is the language used by the Legislature and what effect should be given to that language, because if the language is clear, then I agree with Mr. Limaye that whatever the legislative background may be, the intention of the Legislature can only be gathered by the words used. The material words which call for construction at my hands are, "re-enacted with effect from the date of the coming into operation of this Act," and the contention of Mr. Limaye is that in construing this expression I must exclude 27-5-1947, the date on which the new Act came into force, and calculate the three years from 28. 5.1947, in which case the suit as filed on 27.5.1950, would be in time. On the other hand, Mr. Chitale's contention is that 27-5-1947 should not be excluded in calculating the period of three years, and if 27-5-1947 is included, then the period expired on the midnight of 23.5.1950, and the suit filed is out of time.