STATE OF MAHARASHTRA Vs. LAXMIDAS RANCHHODDAS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) GOVERNMENT issued an order under Section 6 (4) (a) of the Bombay Land Requisition Act on 2-3-1951, requisitioning a fiat situated in a trust property of which the petitioners are the trustees. The order stated that on inquiry it was found that the premises specified in the order had become vacant on or after the month of May 1950. The petitioners' contention was that the order was not valid inasmuch as the premises which were sought to be requisitioned were not premises within the meaning of the expression used in the statute. The contention of the Government on the other hand was that it was not open to the Court to go behind the declaration made in the order and that once the Government had declared that the promises were vacant, the declaration was binding upon the Government both with regard to the vacancy of the premises and the fact that the premises were the premises as defined in the statute. The learned Judge below rejected the contention of Government and held that it was open to the Court to go behind the declaration with regard to the premises and issued the order sought for by the petitioners.

(2.) THE first question, therefore, we have to consider is, what is the effect of a declaration made under Section 6 of the Act ? We must first look at the scheme of Section 6. That section deals with requisitioning of vacant premises. Sub-section (1) provides that it is incumbent upon the landlord to give intimation of any vacancy. Sub-section (2) provides for the manner in which the intimation has to be given. Sub-section (3) contains a prohibition upon the landlord from letting out the premises without the permission of the Government or till after a period of one month has elapsed from the date on which he has given intimation. Sub-section (4) confers upon the State Government the power to requisition premises which are vacant, and it provides :

(3.) THE question that falls to be determined is whether when the Government makes a declaration that the premises were vacant or had become vacant, does the efficacy of the declaration apply not merely to the fact of the vacancy but also to the fact that the premises were the premises to which the Act applies. If we were to take first a purely grammatical view of the matter, what the declaration makes conclusive evidence is that the premises were or had so become vacant. What is made conclusive evidence is not that the premises are premises as defined by the statute and that, they were or had so become vacant. Therefore, the emphasis placed by the Legislature is on the vacancy and not on the question as to whether, the premises were the premises to which this Act applies. But there is another way of looking at the same question. The power of Government to requisition vacant premises under Section 6 is not an unlimited or uncontrolled power. It is a power which is conditioned by the limitations laid down in the Act itself, and before a valid order under Section 6 (4) can be made certain conditions have to be satisfied which are conditions precedent to the exercise of the power by the State, and the conditions are that the requisition must be for a public purpose, that only those premises can be requisitioned to which the Act applies, and the premises must be vacant. No inquiry can be held under Section 6 (4) except with regard to premises which are premises according to the definition in the statute, no declaration can be made except in respect of premises which are premises as defined by the statute, and finally, no order of requisition can be made unless it is an order relating to the premises defined by the statute. Therefore, when reliance is placed upon the declaration and it is contended that the declaration is conclusive, the declaration must be one which the Government is entitled to make under Section 6 (4), and if it is shown that the premises are not the premises as defined by the Act, the Government cannot rely upon the conclusive nature of a declaration which is made without proper authority. Therefore, it is futile to contend that it is not open to the Court to go behind the declaration not only with regard to the fact that the premises are vacant, but oven with regard to the fact that the premises are the premises to which the Act applies, because it would be the duty of the Court to be satisfied that the condition precedent to the exercise of the power has been satisfied, and if the condition precedent is that only premises as defined can be requisitioned, then failure to comply with that condition would deprive the State of its power to act under Section 6 (4 ). As we said before, the power conferred under Section 6 (4) consists of the power to make an inquiry, the power to make a declaration, and ultimately the power to issue the order. The exercise of power under all these three heads depends upon the condition precedent being observed, and if that condition precedent has not been satisfied, the exercise of power is clearly bad. Therefore, if we are satisfied in this case that the premises are not the premises to which the Act applies, not only is the order of requisition itself bad, but all that preceded it and which led up to the passing of that order is equally bad.