JAMNADAS PRABHUDAS Vs. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. This matter came before us on ah earlier occasion and we held that under Section 66A (2), Income -tax Act it was not a fit case for appeal to the Supreme Court. It is now sought to be contended by Sir Jamshedji Kanga that he has a right of appeal under Article 133 (1) (a) and (b) of the Constitution inasmuch as the amount or value of the subject -matter is not less than RS. 20,000, or in the alternative, that the judgment, decree or final order involves directly or indirectly some claim or question respecting property of not less than Rs. 20,000.

(2.) IN our opinion, it is clear that neither Article 133 (1) (a) nor (b) can apply to a judgment given by this Court on a reference made under the Income -tax Act. It is clear that as far as Article 133 (1) (a) is concerned, it requires that the amount or value of the subject -matter of the dispute in the Court of first instance and still in dispute on appeal was and is not less than Rs. 20,000. Therefore, that sub -clause in terms contemplates that there has been an appeal from the Court of first instance and the amount or value of the subject -matter has to be determined both from the point of view of the Court of first instance and from the point of view of the dispute on appeal. The jurisdiction that this Court exercises under the Income -tax Act is not an appellate jurisdiction. It is an advisory or consultative jurisdiction and, therefore, in terms Article 133 (1)(a) would not apply. With regard to clause (b), it is contended by Sir Jamshedji that the same considerations do not apply to sub -Clause (b) as this is a judgment of this Court which, if not directly, at least indirectly involves some claim or question respecting property of not less than Rs. 20,000. Here again the difficulty of Sir Jamshedji is that Article 133 (1) winds up by stating :

(3.) NOW , the first question that has got to be considered is whether a judgment of this Court under Section 66 is a judgment contemplated by the expression "judgment, decree or final order." Sir Jamshedji's contention is that Section 66 (5) provides that the High Court upon Shearing of the reference shall decide the questions of law raised thereby and shall deliver its judgment thereon containing the grounds on which such decision is founded, and a copy of the judgment has to be forwarded to the Appellate Tribunal which shall pass such orders as are necessary to dispose of the case conformably to such judgment, and therefore according to Sir Jamshedji there is an obligation upon the revenue authorities to conform to the judgment; the High Court in delivering a judgment decides the case and therefore the decision of the High Court is a judgment within the meaning of Article 133 (1). If "judgment" was used in the sense in which that expression is used in the Civil Procedure Code and in the sense in which it is used in Section 66 (5), viz. the grounds on which the decision of a Court is based, then undoubtedly Sir Jamshedji would be right. But, in our opinion, - and our opinion is supported by authorities as I shall presently point out -, the expression "judgment, decree or final order" used in Article 133 (1) is used in its technical English sense, which means a final declaration or determination of the rights of parties and it also means a decision given on merits. "Judgment, decree or final order" is a compendious expression and each one of the parts of this expression bear the same connotation, viz. that there is an adjudication by the Court upon the rights of the parties who appear before it. "Judgment" must not be read in this context in contradistinction to "decree or final order."