L S RAJU Vs. STATE OF MYSORE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) (His Lordship after confirming the conviction of accused No- 4 proceeded to consider the Question whether it had been legally established that on January 25 accused No. 1, by giving to accused No. 4 poison in the shape of mercuric chloride, instigated her to murder Medapa).

(2.) Briefly, the case for the prosecution on this aspect of the case is that accused No. 3 went to the approver at 10 a.m. on January 25 and told him that accused No. 4 should come in the evening to the approver's shop and accused No. 1 and others would come there at that time. The approver then went to the house of accused No. 4 and asked her to come in the evening at 8 p.m. Accused Nos. 1 to 3 went in a car to the shop of the approver, accused No. 4 came afterwards, and accused No. 1 as already pointed out asked the approver to take a spoonful of the powder which he had brought in a bottle with him and make a packet and that that packet should be ,given to accused No. 4 to be administered to Medapa, and when accused No. 4 turned up the packet was duly given. There is no direct evidence of what transpired at the shop of the approver except the evidence of the approver himself. The only other evidence 13 the confession of accused No. 4, "and the question of law that we have to consider in this, appeal is to what extent is it necessary that the evidence of an approver should be corroborated before a, Court could act upon it and to what extent is the Court entitled to rely upon the confession of a co-accused as evidence against another accused.

(3.) Before we turn to the authorities, it is necessary to bear certain principles in mind. The law make; an approver's evidence admissible for certain very good reasons. The law is conscious of the fact that a participator in a crime Is not a person who is worthy of credit. He is a tainted witness and he comes into the witness-box with that taint upon him. But the law realises that there are certain offences which could never be proved unless the evidence of an approver was made available. It is unnecessary to point out that there are many offences, the commission of which could only be proved by the evidence of one of the participators in that offence. In this very case, if five people met in the shop of the approver and decided to murder Medapa and decided to instigate accused No. 4 to commit that offence, obviously the only evidence of what happened in that shop could only come from one of these five persons, and if the law insisted that that offence could only be established by evidence of a person other than a participator in the crime, that offence could never be proved. Therefore, there is very good policy underlying the provision of the law that an accomplice is a competent witness against a co-participator in the crime. But the law has also realised and appreciated the danger and the risk which a Court may take in acting solely on the testimony of an approver, and therefore the Courts have themselves laid down a rule of prudence that it would not be safe to act on the uncorroborated testimony of an approver. Both the principles to which we were adverting find statutory recognition in the Evidence Act. Section 133 provides that an accomplice shall be a competent witness against an accused person and a conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. Therefore, as far as the strict language of Section 133 is concerned, even if a conviction is based upon the testimony of an accomplice which has not been corroborated, that conviction is not illegal. But a rule of prudence lias been engrafted upon this provision of the law by S 114, ill. (b), and that illustration is that an accomplice is unworthy or credit unless he is corroborated in material particulars, and so important is this rule of prudence and so much emphasis has been placed upon this rule by various Judges that this rule of prudence has almost acquired the sanctity of a rule of law. Therefore, the rule that, has been accepted by this Court and by other Courts is that it would not be safe to act on the testimony of an approver unless that testimony is corroborated in material particulars. Naturally, the Courts have not insisted upon the corroboration of the testimony of an approver in all particulars. If that had been the rule, then there would hare been no necessity for the evidence of the accomplice at all because the case of the prosecution in that event could have been proved by independent evidence. It is precisely because the case of the prosecution cannot be proved wholly and fully by independent evidence that the law permits the evidence of an accomplice. Therefore, the corroboration that is required in law is not a corroboration of every particular in respect of which the accomplice or approver gives his evidence, but the corroboration must be such as would lead the Court to believe that the evidence that the accomplice is giving is truthful evidence and that it would be safe to act upon that evidence. The corroboration that the Court requires is for its own guidance, for its own mental satisfaction, in order to arrive at the conclusion that it would not be unsafe to act on the testimony of one who is unworthy of credit. Therefore, corroboration must be sought by the Courts from this point of view.