JAGANNATH NARAYAN Vs. VASANT RAMKRISHNA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution for a writ against the Revenue Tribunal which held that the landlord had not terminated the tenancy of his tenant although the tenant was in default in payment of rent because no notice terminating the tenancy had been given. Mr. Patwardhan relies on a decision of this Court given in --'mallikarjun v. Satyanarayan', AIR 1953 Bom 207 (A), and in that decision we pointed out that the Legislature did not make it incumbent upon the landlord to give notice to his tenant when default had been committed in payment of rent. Mr. Chitale with his usual tenacity has made a valiant attempt at distinguishing that judgment and trying to persuade us that, as far as the present case is concerned, we should not follow that decision.

(2.) NOW, what Mr. Chitale points out to us is that when we gave that decision our attention was not drawn to Section 30, Tenancy Act, and Section 30 provides :

(3.) THE next contention of Mr. Chitale is that we must apply to this case the provisions of Section 111 (g) and Mr. Chitale says that that section becomes applicable by reason of Section 3, Tenancy Act, and Section 3 provides that "the provisions of Chap. v. T. P. Act shall, in so far as they are not inconsistent with the previsiors of this Act, apply to the tenancies and leases of lands to which this Act applies. " although Chap. V by reason of Section 117 does not apply to agricultural leases, Mr. Chitale says that the Legislature by enacting Section 3, Tenancy Act has in terms incorporated the provisions of Chap. V. T. P. Act. Mr. Chitale may be right in putting forward this contention, but then we must find some section in Chap. V, T. P. Act which applies to the question that we are considering at present and the only section on which Mr. Chitali can rely is Section 111 (g ). When we turn to Section 111, T. P. Act, it deals with the question of the determination of lease and it lays down various instances under which a tenancy comes to an end, and when we turn to Sub-section (g), it provides that a lease determines by forfeiture, and the three cases of forfeiture are enumerated in that sub-section, and Sub-section (g) (1) provides "in case the lessee breaks an express condition which provides that on breach thereof the lessor may re-enter". Now, this provision can only apply to non-payment of rent provided there is an express clause in the lease that on the tenant failing to pay rent the landlord would be entitled to re-enter. It is only in that case that a forfeiture would result. But for such a clause a tenancy under Section 111 does not come to an end because the tenant fails to pay rent. The tenancy must continue for the fixed period and it would only come to an end by efflux of time. Now, in the present case no question of forfeiture arises because it is not the case of the landlord that the tenancy has come to an end by forfeiture. The landlord relies upon the express provision of the Tenancy Act which provides that the tenancy shall be terminated if the tenant fails to pay rent and that provision is to be found in Section 14 of the Act which in terms States that "a tenancy of any land held by a tenant shall not be terminated unless such tenant. . . . " and Sub-clause (a) provides for failure to pay rent. Therefore, there is a statutory provision in the Tenancy Act for termination of a tenancy by reason of non-payment of rent. We do not find any such provision in the T. P. Act and therefore Section 111 (g), T. P. Act which requires a notice to be given if the landlord relies upon forfeiture for termination of the tenancy has no application to the present case.