NAVROJI ARDESHIR COOPER Vs. OFFICIAL ASSIGNEE OF BOMBAY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE present appeal arises out of a litigation in which the trial Court and the Appellate Division of the High Court have both given judgment on the merits to the same effect. THE latter; stages of the litigation have been conducted at the expense of the present appellants, they having indemnified the trustee until after the decision of the High Court. THE present appellants then applied to the trustee to carry the case further or, failing that, to allow his name to be used by them, they offering a continued indemnity to the trustee. THE trustee declined, and the result was a notice of motion on January 7, 1937, on the Insolvency Side of the High Court, asking the Court to direct the Official Assignee to lend his name to the applicants for the purpose of carrying on the appeal to His Majesty in Council, they offering the usual proper indemnity. That motion was heard in the first instance by Blackwell J. and was refused. THE present appellants then appealed to the Appellate Division of the High Court and it was again refused by that Court.

(2.) IT is sufficient to refer to the reasons given by the Chief Justice in the High Court in which his colleague concurred. He says: If we thought that there was any reasonably good prospect of success in the appeal, we might be prepared to grant the leave. But even, if we directed the Official Assignee to let his name be used, we should then have to be satisfied that there was a substantial point of law before we could grant him leave to go to the Privy Council. In my judgment there is no substantial point of law, so that if we gave the direction asked for in this) appeal, it would carry the matter no further, The decision of the Court of Appeal against which it is desired to appeal to the Privy Council confirmed the judgment of the lower Court, and both the trial Judge and the Court of Appeal expressed a very emphatic opinion that; the plaintiff had no cause of action.

(3.) THIS conclusion must necessarily result in the failure of the present appeal. It is to be borne in mind that if this appeal succeeded, the next step would be an application to the High Court for leave to appeal. The judgment already given in the High Court makes it clear that that application would fail. The next step would be an application to His Majesty in Council for special leave to appeal. In view of what their Lordships have just stated, their Lordships would be bound to advise His Majesty to refuse special leave. It follows that to allow the present appeal would in no whit benefit the appellants and would merely lead to expenditure of money in costs.