(1.) 1.This is an appeal against the judgment and decree of the Joint Subordinate Judge of Ahmedabad dismissing a suit brought by the appellant to recover the sum of Rs. 5,300 from the respondent who is the appellant-plaintiff's step-mother. The plaintiff's case was that he and his father Tribhovandas, husband of the defendant-respondent Bai Dahi, were members of a joint family and possessed joint family properties and that a sum of Rs. 5,000 forming part of the joint family money was deposited by him in the Saraspur Mills, Limited, of Ahmedabad on April 30, 1932. It is an admitted fact that this money was deposited and that it was deposited in the joint names of the plaintiff's father Patel Tribhovandas Jamnadas and Bai Dahi his wife. A receipt (exhibit 95) given by the company contained these words: "Tribhovandas Jamnadas is the owner of the money. After his lifetime (which means after his death) Bai Dahi is to get the same." Tribhovandas died on September 20, 1932, and on February 22, 1934, the plaintiff sued Bai Dahi to recover the amount of the deposit with interest. At that time the money was still with the Saraspur Mills, Ltd., and that company was made a defendant to the suit, and an interim injunction was given prohibiting the company from paying over the money to Bai Dahi. However, on April 27, 1934, this interim injunction was discharged, and the money which amounted with interest to Rs. 5,300 was paid to Bai Dahi on security being given by her. The plaint was then amended, and defendant No.2 was struck off from the record. The plaintiff seeks to recover the money on the ground that it belongs to him after the death of his father.
(2.) THE case set up by the defendant was that the plaintiff had separated from his father about twenty years before the suit and had no interest in the property which his father had at the time of his death. In any case, she claimed to be entitled to the amount of the deposit receipt under the terms of exhibit 95.
(3.) IF we had found it possible to agree with the learned trial Judge on the question of the legal character of this transaction, we might have avoided having to remand the case. But we think he was mistaken in his construction of the document. The appellant naturally relies on the decision of the Privy Council in Guran Ditta v. Ram Ditto (1928) L.R. 55 I.A. 235, s.c. 30 Bom. L.R. 1384. It was held there that the deposit by a Hindu of his own money in a bank in the joint names of himself and wife, and on the terms that it is to be payable to either or the survivor, does not on his death constitute a gift by him to his wife, and that there is a resulting trust in his favour in the absence of proof of a contrary intention, there being no presumption of an intended advancement in favour of a wife. It was pointed out in the judgment of their Lordships that the general principle of equity applicable both in this country and in India is that in the case of a voluntary conveyance of property by a grantor, without any declaration of trust, there is a resulting trust in favour of the grantor, unless it can be proved that an actual gift was intended. There is an exception to this rule in English law, and a gift to a wife is presumed where money belonging to the husband is deposited at a bank in the name of a wife, or where a deposit is made as in the present case in the joint names of both husband and wife. But their Lordships further pointed out that this exception has not been admitted in Indian law and that there is no presumption of an intended advancement as there is in England, and consequently the general rule applies. The ownership of the money deposited under these circumstances depends on the source from which it came. It is common ground here that Bai Dahi had no interest in the money at the time it was deposited. It was 'either Tribhovandas' property or the joint property of himself and his son. The Privy Council case therefore makes it perfectly clear that the mere fact that a deposit was made in the name of Bai Dahi does not show that a gift to her was intended.