GANGAPPAGOUDA GADIGEPPAGOUDA PATIL Vs. BASAYYA SHIVARUDRAYYA LINGAD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THESE are second appeals from decisions of the District Judge of Bijapur, all raising the same point of law.

(2.) THE plaintiff in all these suits was suing for damages for defamation, the statements made by the several defendants being substantially the same. THE trial Judge decreed the plaintiff's suits, holding that the statements were defamatory, untrue and made maliciously. THE learned District Judge in appeal set aside the decrees passed by the trial Judge on the ground that the statements, which he agreed were defamatory, untrue and malicious, were absolutely privileged, and the question we have to decide is whether that view of the law is right. We are, of course, bound by the findings of the lower Courts as to the facts that the statements were untrue and malicious, and there can be no question that they were defamatory in their nature : so that it is only on that basis that we have to consider whether they were privileged. No qualified privilege will help the defendants in view of the finding as to malice.

(3.) TO my mind, the principle which the learned District Judge endeavoured to extract out of Watson v. M'Ewan (supra) is inconsistent with the decision of the Privy Council in O'Connor v. Waldron [1935] A.C. 76. In that case defamatory statements had been made before the Commissioner holding an inquiry under the Combines Investigation Act, a Canadian Statute, and the Privy Council held that the Commissioner holding the inquiry was not exercising the attributes of a Court of law. The Board relied largely on the fact that the Commissioner's conclusion was expressed in a report, that it determined no rights, nor the guilt or innocence of any one, and that it did not even initiate any proceedings, which had to be left to the ordinary criminal procedure. The Board, I think, held that prima facie an officer, who merely has to make a report to some other authority, is not exercising judicial functions, although the Board expressly recognized that there were some cases, for instance, a military Court of inquiry, or an investigation by an ecclesiastical commission, where there were conditions as to the way in which the tribunal exercised its functions, and as to the effect of its decisions which led to the conclusion that such tribunals had attributes similar to those of a Court of justice. That decision is relevant in this case on the question whether the Mahalkari was exercising the attributes of a Court of law, although I do not think that authority on that point is really necessary. But the real importance of the case for the present purpose is that the Commissioner in that case was holding an inquiry with a view to making a report showing whether an offence had been committed under the Combines Investigation Act, and it was not suggested either in the arguments, or in the judgment of the Board, that the evidence given before the Commissioner, although not given in any form of judicial proceeding, was nevertheless absolutely privileged, because the same evidence might be given again in proceedings instituted as a result of the Commissioner's inquiry.