PANDHARI SITARAM Vs. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Heard the learned Counsel for the parties.

(2.) Here is a prisoner, who was sentenced to suffer life imprisonment for the offence punishable under Sec. 302 of the Indian Penal Code, who has a grievance that the respondent ought to have released him prematurely, the next day of completion of his 65 years of age, by virtue of the provisions made in the Government Resolution dtd. 10/01/2006 and the earlier Government Resolution of 1965, as if such premature release of the petitioner is a matter of right for him, which accrued to him the moment he completed his 65 years of age. This premise of the petitioner is, however, misplaced. The fact is that there is no right conferred upon the prisoner like the petitioner to obtain automatic premature release, the day he completes age of 65 years. The Government Resolution relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner requires recording of finding by the competent authority regarding completion of 65 years of age and the prisoner having gone so weak as would not be able to stand his further imprisonment. Such determination would naturally require verification of facts, application of mind to the verified facts in the light of the guidelines laid down in the Government Resolution in question and arriving at a final conclusion. This process would require some time and in this case, the Medical Committee, as seen from the reply of the respondent, was indeed seized of the matter and it gave its report regarding infirmity of the petitioner on 31/05/2018. Even before that, it appears that the respondent had already made and verified the fact of completion of 65 years of age by the petitioner. The Medical Committee met on 31/05/2018 and gave an opinion that the petitioner had gone weak, apart from having completed 65 years of age and thus had become eligible for his premature release. This opinion was given by the Medical Committee on 31/05/2018 and on that very day, the petitioner was released from prison prematurely, by the respondent. On that day, as seen from the reply, the petitioner had completed imprisonment of 14 years, 4 months and 9 days. The learned A.P.P. states that the typist, who typed the reply for the respondent dtd. 04/01/2020 (the learned A.P.P. does not know the name of the typist) has committed a clerical error in mentioning in paragraph 7 the period of actual imprisonment undergone by the petitioner till his release on 31/05/2018. He submits that this period be read as 14 years, 4 months and 9 days till 30/04/2018. If this is true, it is clear that the petitioner had undergone a period of actual imprisonment of 14 years, 5 months and 9 days as of 31/05/2018. There is, however, still some confusion about the exact period of actual imprisonment suffered by the petitioner. So, let us attempt to have clarity about this issue.

(3.) In the present case, it is not in dispute that the date of birth of the petitioner being 25/10/1951, the petitioner completed 65 years of age on 25/10/2016. As per the period calculated by the respondent, the petitioner completed 14 years of actual imprisonment on 28/03/2018, although it is the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that this period was completed on 06/03/2018. However, we would not accept the submission of the petitioner about his completion of 14 years of imprisonment on 06/03/2018 and we would go by the statement made in this regard by the respondent, presuming that it is based upon the official record. So, the eligibility for release of the petitioner prematurely was to be examined by the respondent from the date of 29/03/2018 and not any earlier date. The petitioner has been released prematurely from jail on 31/05/2018 barely about two months after he had completed 14 years of imprisonment, which is one of the essential requirements for premature release of the prisoner like the petitioner. The delay, if at all it was there, was of only about two months before the petitioner could be prematurely released. So, the question is, whether or not there was any delay in premature release of the petitioner. In our opinion, there was no delay in this case and our reasons follow.