MANISH SHASHIKATN SHAH Vs. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Rule. With the consent of parties made returnable forthwith.

(2.) This petition is directed against the order passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 33rd Court, Ballard Pier, Mumbai, rejecting the application of the petitioner- complainant for being permitted to summon the Income Tax Officer for proving the document at Exh.26 before the Court. The petitioner had completed his evidence and the matter proceeded further for recording statement of accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Thereafter the petitioner realised that the document at Exh.26 was already on record and had remained to be proved. Therefore, the petitioner applied for being examined again. The petitioner was allowed to be examined again and in the course of cross examination, accused seems to have disputed document at Exh.26 and therefore, the petitioner applied for summoning Income Tax Officer. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the judgment of Supreme Court in P. Chhaganlal Daga -vs- M. Sanjay Shaw, 2003 11 SCC 486, about the powers of the Court for tendering additional material relevant for just determination of the case. In that case the trial Court felt that the material was necessary for just decision of the case and had allowed the material to come on record. THIS order of the Magistrate was questioned before the High Court and High Court set aside the same. Thus, it is not that the trial Court has refused to look into the matter. Ordinarily superior Courts would be slow in interfering in the matters pertaining to trial and therefore, if the trial Judge had come to the conclusion that the material was necessary for just decision of the case, it was obviously improper for the High Court to interfere. In the present case the learned Magistrate has given fair opportunity even after completion of evidence of petitioner to have the petitioner examined again. But now if the petitioner wants to drag on the trial further for a lapse on the part of petitioner himself, the petitioner cannot seek the help of this Court. The petition is thoroughly misconceived. The interference by the superior Courts at the interlocutory stages in the trial has to be avoided as far as possible unless such interference would be necessary to prevent failure of justice. A person who is not vigilant about the rights and obligations as to speedy trial must suffer. The petition is, therefore, dismissed.