STATE OF MAHARASHTRA Vs. GAUTAM

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The appeal is to challenge the judgment and Order dated 11/9/2000 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Chimur in Regular Criminal Case No. 316 of 1991 (Old Case No. 329 of 1988) whereby the accused were acquitted of the offences punishable under sections 147, 148, 149, 324 and 452 of the Indian Penal Code. The accused were facing trial on the charge that they had formed an unlawful assembly on 15/09/1988, at about 9 p.m. at Mauja Khapri in Chimur Tahsil, Chandrapur District and in prosecution of the common object of the assembly, were armed with stick, a deadly weapon; committed house trespass by entering in the house of Bhaurao having made preparation to cause hurt and caused hurt to the complainant Pramila and her family members and voluntarily caused hurt to Pramila and Father Bhaurao with stick. The facts, briefly stated, are as under:-

(2.) Learned A.P.P. argued that the trial Court ought to have held the accused guilty of forming unlawful assembly with an unlawful object to commit criminal trespass and beating the victim Bhaurao. The trial Court was in error to hold that the victim had not specifically identified the assailants. It is submitted that the trial Court gave undue importance to minor omissions of non-disclosure of specific names of the members of the unlawful assembly. Learned A.P.P. submitted that the trial Court ought to have considered the corroborative evidence of the relatives of victim Bhaurao to nail the accused. He, therefore, prayed to set aside the impugned judgment and order.

(3.) On the other hand, learned Advocate for the respondents submitted that the impugned judgment is free from any fault and is well reasoned. According to Learned Advocate for the respondents, there was material omission regarding the alleged dragging of Bhaurao out of the house and there was no evidence of identification of the offender by the main witness Bhaurao. The trial Court rightly observed the inconsistencies and the discrepancies inherent in the prosecution case. The Medical Officer who allegedly examined the injured was not examined. There was also inconsistency regarding the exact place of assault. The F.I.R. was unreasonably delayed till the next day of the incident. Ramesh Shirbhaiiye (PW-3) was disowned by prosecution as he did not support the prosecution case. Regarding interference in the order of acquittal, learned Advocate Shri Jawade made a reference to the rulings in the cases of (V.S. Achuthanandan Vs. R. Balkrishna Pillai & ors, 2011 3 SCC 317) and (State of U.P. Vs. Ram Sajivan & Ors., 2010 AIR(SC) 1738) to argue that no doubt the Appellate Court do have power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is founded. The Code of Criminal procedure has not put any limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of the appellate power of the Court and the appellate Court is free to arrive at such conclusion on facts and law, as it may consider appropriate, even to upset the order of acquittal if there are substantial and compelling grounds to reverse the order. However, the appellate Court has to bear in mind that, in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. The presumption of innocence is available as in criminal jurisprudence. Every accused is presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. The presumption of innocence is further bolstered up by an order of acquittal. Thus, If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court.