UNION OF INDIA, REPRESENTED BY THE CHIEF ENGINEER (NAVY) NAVAL BASE POST, KOCHI, THROUGH COMMANDER WORKS ENGINEERS (NAVY) VASCO-DA-GAMA Vs. M/S. CONSOLIDATED CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, PATELS BUNGALOW, NEAR ELECTRICITY DEPARTMENT, DACORLIM, GOA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) HEARD Shri M. Amonkar, learned Central Government Standing Counsel appearing for the Central Government/appellant and Shri Nitin Sardessai, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent. The above appeal challenges the order dated 8/07/2003, passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Margao in Civil Misc. Application No. 183/2000.

(2.) BRIEFLY the facts of the case are that the appellant awarded a contract to respondent No. 1 to construct a Gymnasium at I.N.S. Hansa at Vasco and the wok order was placed with the respondent No. 1 whereby the date of the commencement of the work was fixed as from 31/07/1990 and the date of the completion was fixed as 30/07/1991. The work was completed by respondent No. 1 after the extended date of completion i.e. on 31/07/1996. Since there were differences between the parties, the respondent No. 1 requested the appellant to appoint an Arbitrator as per condition No. 70 and such request was made by letter dated 24/02/1997. The appellant claimed that they appointed respondent No. 2 as the sole Arbitrator conditionally by their letter dated 23/04/1998. In the meanwhile, the respondent No. 1 filed an application under Section of the Arbitration Act, 1996 before this Court for appointment of Arbitrator as according to them the appellant failed to accede to the request of respondent No. 1 to such appointment of Arbitrator. Accordingly, on 30/04/1998 this Court appointed respondent No. 2 as the sole Arbitrator. Thereafter, the respondent No. 2 proceeded with the arbitration proceedings and passed the award dated 30/03/2000. The appellants filed an application under Section of the Arbitration Act, 1996 disputing two amounts awarded by the Arbitrator. The said claims were pertaining to claim No. 5 and claim No. 8. Claim No. 5 was with regard to the extra expenses incurred due to abnormal prolongation of the contract period due to the various breaches on the part of the applicant and claim No. 8 was the incorrect and illegal preparation of the deviation totally against the terms and conditions of the contract. On account of the claim No. 5 of Rs. 32,80,000/ -, the learned respondent No. 2 awarded a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/ -and as against the claim No. 8, the Arbitrator awarded a negative sum of Rs. 35,000/ -as against the claim of Rs. 6,92,000/ -and odd. By the impugned order, the learned Additional District Judge rejected the application filed by the applicant under Section of the said Act. Being aggrieved by the said order, the appellant has preferred the present appeal.

(3.) ON the other hand, Shri Nitin Sardessai, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent has supported the impugned order. Learned Counsel pointed out that the learned Judge after minutely perusing the evidence on record as well as the material produced by the said respondent has come to the conclusion that the appointment by this Court by order dated 30/04/1998 suggests that there was no appointment of an Arbitrator by the applicant before the appointment by this court. The learned Counsel has taken me through the order passed by this Court at the time of appointment and pointed out that the applicant did not even disclose to this Court that such appointment was effected by the applicant. The learned Counsel further pointed out that as the Arbitrator was appointed by this Court, the question of claiming that such appointment was subject to some conditions imposed by letter dated 23/04/1998 would not arise. In support of his submissions, learned Counsel has relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court reported in : 2007 (7) SCC 684 in the case of Union of India V/s. M/s. Bharat Battery Manufacturing Co. (P) Ltd. The learned Counsel has taken me through the award passed by the learned Arbitrator and pointed out that there is no infirmity committed by the Arbitrator whilst passing the impugned order and, as such, the question of interference by this Court would not arise at all. It is well settled that the objections under Section are only in respect of the objections dealing with public policy and in the present case such is not the consideration and, as such, the appeal deserves to be rejected.