SURENDRA INDUSTRIES LIMITED Vs. A L ALASPURKAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioner company is aggrieved by the order dated 8th February, 1991 passed by the Industrial Court, Thane in Complaint (U. L. P.) No. 46 of 1983 filed by the respondent No. 2 employee, under section 28 read with section 30 and Item 9 of Schedule IV of the M. R. T. U. and P. U. L. P. Act, 1971 praying for a declaration that the respondents in the complaint had engaged in the unfair labour practice of failure to implement the Award dated 31st December, 1981 in Reference (I. D. A.) No. 589 of 1976 and for a direction to desist from engaging in the unfair labour practice complained of. The reference was between the original employers, viz. , Esskay Steel Rolling Mills and the workman Shri Mangli. The petitioner is the company which according to the workman is the successor in interest of the original employer and is liable to implement the Award against the original employer. For the sake of convenience the parties will be hereinafter referred to as "the petitioner company" and the "original employer" i. e. (Esskay) and the workman. In the complaint before the Industrial Court in addition to the original employer, its manager, Shri S. P. Sharma as the partner of the original employer and the petitioner company were arrayed as the respondent Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4. It appears that the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 did not contest the complaint after the interim orders were passed and it was the petitioner company that contested the complaint till the end and it is doing so even before this Court. The respondent No. 3 in the petition i. e. the original employer is absent even before me though duly served.

(2.) THE workman succeeded before the Labour Court on 31st December, 1981 to get the order of his termination passed by the original employer on 21st November, 1975 set aside and to get the order against them to reinstate him with full backwages and continuity of service. In spite of his herculean efforts, he has been as yet, even after the turn of the century, not able to taste the fruit of his successful Award. According to Shri P. K. Rele, the learned Senior Counsel, the petitioner is not liable to implement the Award against the original employer as the petitioner was not successor in interest of the said original employer and did not step in the shoes of the original employer. The original employer and its partners are liable to implement the Award, argues the learned Counsel. They are not contesting even from the stage of the Industrial Court and they are absent here also, purposely, says Shri Rele. According to the petitioner it had merely purchased "the used and old plant and machinery along with its shed and structure as is where is condition situated at Surendra Industries Compound 2nd Pokhram Road, Thane" for a sum of Rs. 8,34,300/- as reflected in the Bill No. 2505 dated 22nd January, 1981 of the original employer. It is their emphatic case that they had not stepped in the shoes of the original employer as transferee of the whole undertaking and they had never accepted any other liabilities, including those of the employees of the original employer. They have point blank and flatly denied any liability to implement the said Award. Shri Rele further submitted that the original employer had closed down its business at Thane and had shifted its activities at Tarapur and therefore the workman should enforce his Award against them and not against the petitioner. According to Shri Rele the Industrial Court had no jurisdiction to decide the complicated issue whether the petitioner could be held to be successor in interest and to be liable to implement the Award passed not against them but against the original employer under an executory and limited jurisdiction under Item 9 of Schedule IV of the Act. Shri Rele further submitted that except an interested version of the original employer that the petitioner was their successor in interest, there was no evidence to substantiate the said plea of the original employer taken only to shift the burden of the Award on the petitioner. It was not a case of transfer of a running concern as contemplated under section 25-FF of the I. D. Act, says Shri Rele. Therefore, no liability of any nature was shifted to nor was it accepted by the petitioner and nor was there any oral or documentary evidence to that effect adduced by the original employer.

(3.) SHRI Singhavi, the learned Counsel for the workman has wholly supported the impugned order as legal, proper and valid. He submitted that the Industrial Court was right in deciding the complaint holding both the original employer and the petitioner as successor in interest of the original employer under section 18 (3) (c) of the I. D. Act as liable to implement the Award. Shri Singhavi, further added that the Industrial Court was well within its jurisdiction and had rightly decided the question of liability of the petitioner on the basis of sufficient material on record and that this Court need not interfere with the impugned order under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which is meant for doing justice and the Industrial Court has done justice in this case. He also relied on the two material letter in support of his submissions. In a letter dated 20th November 1980 addressed by the petitioner to the President of the Union stating that the workers of the Esskay Steel Rolling Mills were taken by their units, and a letter addressed by the Esskay on 30th October, 1980 to the Government of Maharashtra under section 25-FFA of the I. D. Act to inform the authority its intention to close the factory. In the said letter columns 8 and 9 are important to which my pointed attention was drawn by the learned Counsel. He further submitted that though the concerns are said to be different, all were situated in the compound named after the petitioner and that they are closely interlinked and that one partner in the original employer was a director of the petitioner company. He further made a serious grievance that all the documentary evidence was with the original employer and the petitioner and none produced before the Court to discharge their respective burden and that the workman had primarily proved his case against both of them that both were jointly and severally liable to obey the order of the Court, but the workman was thrown by them at each other like a shuttle cock.