RAMCHANDRA NARAYAN RAO Vs. SUB DIVISIONAL OFFICER MANDUR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioner, the most unfortunate creature, who is a called citizen under our Constitution and an integral and inseparable constituent of the "we the People" is being tossed ruthlessly from one Court to another Court. Not by a private employer but by the authorities of our Welfare State. In the year 1990 the State has taken away from him his land approximately admeasuring eight acres, the only source of his livelihood. He is now put in the category of Project Affected Persons, vide letter dated 10-4-2000 addressed by the District Rehabilitation Officer. No doubt he might have been given compensation in accordance with law but in my opinion compensation is no substitute for the land. The compensation gets evaporated soon while the land continues as mother land-source of livelihood for generations. To help such persons our welfare State has provided for giving jobs to all such persons whose land was or is taken by the State for different projects and for different public purposes. Even job which many times is temporary is no substitute for the land as the employee retires at some point of time while the land gets inheritated down to the generations as a source of livelihood of the poor farmers. None the less the present petitioner became a project affected person as certified by the officer of the State itself. Even as a project affected person the respondents have not provided him any job. Shri Sonawane, the learned AGP submits that at present there is no project work going on and therefore, the petitioner cannot be absorbed in anywhere. He further submits that if he makes a proper application to the proper authority his name would be maintained in the waiting list of the persons to provide job to such projected affected persons. The petitioner has already done so but in vain.

(2.) HOWEVER, in the present petition I am concerned with the impugned order passed by the Industrial Court on 22-10-1999 in Revision Application No. 177 of 1997 under section 44 of the M. R. T. U. and P. U. L. P. Act, 1971. By the impugned order the learned member of the Industrial Court has reversed the order of the Labour Court dated 8-7-1997 whereby the learned Labour Judge had allowed the complaint filed by the petitioner employee and he was granted reinstatement with full backwages and continuity of service. This is the later portion of the events with which we are immediately concerned. However, earlier the petitioner had filed a complaint of Unfair Labour Practices complaining against the respondents that his services were terminated on and from 3-2-1987 illegally, improperly and in violation of the mandatory provisions of section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. By its order dated 18-3-1996 the Labour Court had dismissed the complaint. The petitioner was aggrieved by the said order of the Labour Court, and therefore he preferred a Revision Application under section 44 of the Act before the Industrial Court. By its order dated 3-6-1997 the learned member of the Industrial Court reversed the said order of the Labour Court and remanded matter back to the Labour Court for fresh hearing and fresh decision in accordance with law. After remand the Labour Court allowed the complaint by its order dated 8-7-1997. This time the Industrial Court dismissed the complaint by reversing the order of the Labour Court. The petitioner is aggrieved by the last order of the Industrial Court dated 22-10-1999.

(3.) I have gone through the entire proceedings very carefully. I have also heard both the learned Counsel on both the sides at length. The nub of the petitioners complaint before the labour Court was that his services were terminated with effect from 3-7-1987 in violation of section 25-F of the I. D. Act, 1947. According to him no retrenchment compensation was offered and no wages in lieu of notice were offered. The respondents had contested the complaint and had contended that the petitioner was employed on daily wage from 22-9-1980 (Exh. I) and was given work as and when work was available and that he had no right to be continued in employment. It was also contended that there was no question of complying with the section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act.