(1.) THIS petition under Article 227 of Constitution of India takes exception to the order passed by Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Pune, Camp at Kolhapur dated 19th August, 1988 in Rev. Application No. MRT-SS-77/1988. The land is question bears Gat No. 1048 admeasuring 3 Hectors 91 R of village Sawarde. The said land originally belonged to Gangubai Pandurang Kulkarni, now represented by respondents Nos. 3 to 8. According to the petitioner the suit land was leased out to him by a registered lease deed on 2nd March, 1978. However, according to the respondents 1 and 2 the suit land were purchased by them for 3 Anna share each from Gangubai Kulkarni and others on 28th April, 1978 and, pursuant to the said transaction, they were put in possession of the suit land and were enjoying the same since then. The petitioner however, claims that he has been wrongfully dispossessed, therefore, filed application before the Tahsildar, Tasgaon under section 70 (b) of Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred as said Act) for a declaration that he was the tenant in the suit land and also for relief of possession under section 29 of the said Act. The said application was filed on 31st of December, 1979. Although sufficient opportunity was given to the petitioner to produce the relevant record, including the registered lease deed in support of his case, however, that opportunity was not availed and on every occasion the matter was required to be adjourned on one pretext or the other. On 15th of November, 1980, the petitioner once again made request to the tenancy authority for deferring the case on the ground that he was not in position to secure copy of the registered sale deed. The request was refused and the petitioner was called upon to proceed with the case. But instead of proceeding with the matter and/or filing any formal application for adjournment on any other ground, the petitioner without taking note of the direction passed by the tenancy authority walked out of the Court room. In the circumstances, the tenancy authority was left with no other option but to dismiss the application for want of prosecution vide order dated November 15, 1980. That order was challenged before Sub-Divisional Officer, Miraj, Division Miraj by way of Tenancy Appeal No. 3/1981. The Appellate Authority after adverting to the relevant record, endorsed the approach adopted by the tenancy authority in dismissing the application for want of prosecution. Besides the authority also adverted to the record and observed that admittedly the respondents 1 and 2 were in possession of the land. Moreover, the alleged registered lease deed which was executed in favour of the petitioner was for 11 months and it did not give any right to him to become a tenant. The Appellate Authority accordingly rejected the appeal by order dated March 3, 1985. The petitioner carried the matter in Revision before Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Camp at Kolhapur bearing Revision Application No. MRT-SS-77/1985. The Tribunal rejected the petitioners contention, both relation to the approach adopted by the tenancy authority in dismissing the application for want of prosecution as also on merits by observing that the 7/12 extracts of the village records in respect of the suit land for the year 1975-76 to 1977-78 would indicate that the suit land was cultivated by Gungubai the erstwhile owner. The said extracts also reveal that the crops grown on the suit land were Jirayat crops such as Hybrid Jowar, Tur, Matki, Groundnut and chilly, which crops are generally harvested before the end of February. The Tribunal further observed that there was no allegation in the application of the petitioner that he was in possession of the suit land when the said crops were standing in 1977-78. This observation is in the context that the claim set up by the petitioner was that he was put in possession of the suit land on 2nd March, 1978. The Tribunal therefore, observed that, prima-facie, the petitioner could not be said to be in possession between 2nd March, 1978 to 28th of April, 1978 on which date the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were put in possession of the suit lands pursuant to the transaction between them and the erstwhile owner Gangubai dated 28th April, 1978. The Tribunal has observed that no evidence has been adduced by the petitioner that he was in possession of the suit land during the relevant period i. e. between 2nd March, 1978 to 28th April, 1978. In the circumstances, the Tribunal dismissed the application preferred by the petitioner vide impugned order. Application filed by the applicant under section 84 of the said Act was also rejected.
(2.) THE learned Counsel for the petitioners contends that the registered lease deed would clearly indicate that the petitioner was in possession on the suit land and there would be presumption that the petitioner was occupying the suit land before the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 became owners thereof and claim to have come in possession by virtue of transaction dated 28th April, 1978. He therefore, submits that the petitioner could not have been dispossessed save and except by taking recourse to the provisions of law. In the circumstances, according to him, this is a fit case which requires further enquiry on the merits of the rival claim for which reason the matter be remanded to the tenancy authority. Mr. Patil further contends that the petitioner has already suffered the consequences of hlis inaction and/or purported audacity of walking out of the Court as his application has been dismissed for want of prosecution and therefore, the matter requires to be remanded for further investigation so as to meet the ends of justice.
(3.) HAVING considered the abovesaid arguments, I see no reason to interfere in exercise of writ jurisdiction. In the first place, no fault can be found with the approach of the tenancy authority in dismissing the application for want of prosecution. The record clearly indicates and which position is fairly accepted by the learned Counsel that more than one opportunity was given to the petitioners to produce the relevant documents and evidence in support of his case. Accordingly request for adjournment on same count was rejected on 15th of November, 1980 and the authorities called upon the petitioner to proceed with the matter. The petitioner without making a formal application for adjournment on any other ground walked out from the Court room which fact has been so recorded by tenancy authority and the same is not challenged. In the circumstances, the tenancy authority was justified in dismissing application for want of prosecution. The courts below have therefore, rightly confirmed the said approach of the tenancy authority having regard to the facts and circumstance of the present case.