(1.) RULE. By consent rule is made returnable forthwith.
(2.) THE petitioner had filed the Complaint against respondent No. 2 in the Industrial Court, Nagpur being complaint (U. L. P. A.) No. 326/96. The complaint was fixed for hearing on 25-7-98, 30-7-98 and 18-9-98 and then lastly the date was adjourned to 14-10-98. The petitioner was present on 25-7-98, 30-7-98 and on 18-9-98 but was absent on 14-10-98 when the matter was adjourned to 5-11-98. It is the case of the petitioner that he was suffering from Typhoid fever from 2-11-98 to 11-11-98, therefore he could not attend the Court on 5-11-98 when the matter was fixed for evidence. On 5-11-98 though the petitioner was absent, an application was made by his Advocate for adjournment but the Member, Industrial Court, Nagpur rejected the application for adjournment and dismissed the case for default.
(3.) THE petitioner applied for restoration of the complaint on 17-11-98 and enclosed a copy of Medical Certificate of a Doctor indicating that he was suffering from Typhoid fever w. e. f. 2-11-98 to 11-11-98. Since the restoration application was made hardly 10 days after the dismissal of complaint in default, normally speaking the Labour Court ought to have decided the matter on the basis of the affidavit. But, instead of that he embarked upon a separate enquiry in which he recorded the evidence of the petitioner and after lengthy analysis of the evidence came to the conclusion that the applicant had failed to show good and sufficient cause for not attending the Court on 5-11-1998. This order was passed by the Member, Industrial Court, Nagpur on 2-11-2001, i. e. about three years after making of the application for restoration. I find the entire approach of the Member, Industrial Court, Nagpur in this matter appears to be improper and incorrect. There was absolutely no reason for the member, Industrial Court, Nagpur to keep such a petty application pending for a period of three years. The Industrial Court has been constituted to give speedy justice in labour matters and not to waste time deciding ancillary matters keeping aside the main disputers. Besides, the analysis of the evidence given by the Presiding Officer appears to be perverse. He disbelieved the petitioner because the petitioner stated in the evidence that he had asked his brother to inform his Advocate by telephone of his inability to attend. Whereas, in the application (Exh. 14) the Advocate for the complainant had written that the complainant had informed about his inability to attend due to personal difficulty. When in fact, the petitioner had taken the trouble to inform the Court about his difficulty and his Counsel had placed the matter on record, the sickness of the petitioner due to Typhoid could be said to be the personal difficulty mentioned in the application. It is not difficult to imagine a situation where Counsel was not given full particulars of nature of the sickness or personal difficulty.