RAMA DHONDU DATE Vs. KRISHNAJI BHIKAJI KADAM

JUDGEMENT

(1.) BOTH these writ petitions can be disposed of by common judgment since they are between the common parties and involve same question.

(2.) WRIT Petition No. 4667 of 1984 pertains to land bearing Survey Nos. 17 and 18 situated at Terao, whereas Writ Petition No. 5021 of 1984 pertains to land bearing Survey No. 298 Hissa No. 1 at village Terao. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were landlords of the said lands. The respondent No. 3 is the uncle of the petitioner herein in both these matters. It is the petitioners case that respondent Nos. 1 and 2 granted the above said suit lands to the petitioners father and the respondent No. 3 under registered lease deed dated 31-8-1944 for a period of 5 years. It is not in dispute that section 5 of the Act of 1948 (The Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948) provided security from termination of lease upto a period of 10 years except on the grounds under section 14 of the Act. As the persons in possession under such leases were treated to be protected tenants. Section 5 of the Act of 1948 was further amended in 1952 and again in 1956. By Act of 1956 which came into force on 1-8-1956. Section 4-B in the present form came to be inserted. Accordingly, though the lease in favour of the petitioners father and uncle (respondent No. 3) expired on 31-8-1949, they continued to be tenants and became deemed tenants. By the amendment to the provisions of the Act of 1948, a person in lawful cultivation of any agricultural land belonging to another person became deemed tenant and a deemed purchaser with effect from 1-4-1957. In this backdrop it is the petitioners case that the petitioners father and respondent No. 3 jointly became deemed purchaser of the suit lands on 1-4-1957. It is also not in dispute that the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 landlords had filed suit for recovery of possession of the suit lands against the petitioners father as well as respondent No. 3 some time in 1953, which fact presupposes that the petitioners father was treated as a joint tenant even by the landlords having regard to the registered lease referred to above.

(3.) THE petitioners father, however, died in the year 1958. At the relevant time, the petitioner was serving in Armed forces and was away from the village. It appears that although the petitioners father and respondent No. 3 came in possession of the suit land as joint tenants, but in the record of rights only the name of the respondent No. 3 was shown in the cultivation column. It is on that premise the tenancy authority initiated suo motu proceedings under section 32-G of the Act only in favour of the respondent No. 3. That proceedings were commenced some time in 1965 and ultimately allowed in favour of the respondent No. 3 by declaring him as deemed purchaser by order dated 19-8-1972. As mentioned earlier, the petitioner was away from the village as he was in the Armed forces and coupled with the fact that the petitioner never got or had notice of that proceedings. The petitioner retired from the armed forces in 1978 and after returning to his village started asserting his right over the suit lands claiming that he had equal share therein which was inherited through his father who was the joint tenant along with the respondent No. 3. It is only thereafter the respondent No. 3 filed a suit against the petitioner being Civil Suit No. 29 of 1980 and the petitioner was served with the injunction order. As soon as injunction order was served along with the other documents, it is stated that, the petitioner got knowledge about the proceedings under section 32-G which had ended in favour of the respondent No. 3 and, therefore, he immediately rushed to the Appellate Authority by filing two separate appeals challenging the orders passed by the tenancy authority dated 21-1-1965 with regard to the Survey Nos. 17 and 18 at village Terao and dated 19-8-1972 with regard to Survey No. 298 Hissa No. 1 at village Terao, being Appeal Nos. 24 and 23 respectively. Both these appeals were heard and disposed of on the same day on 23-8-1982, albeit by separate orders. The Appellate Authority in substance held that there was inordinate and unexplained delay inasmuch as in one proceedings the order was passed in the year 1965 and in the other in the year 1972; whereas the appeals were filed in the year 1980. Further, the Appellate Authority observed that the petitioner had no locus to challenge the orders passed by the tenancy authority since he was not a party in the original proceedings. The Appellate Authority further held that the grievance made by the petitioner that he had no notice about the earlier tenancy proceedings is devoid of merit, for it was not necessary to give him notice under section 32-G as the same was sent to the respondent No. 3 whose sole name appeared in the revenue records as cultivating the suit lands as tenant. Further, the Appellate Authority observed that the matter in issue could be answered only by a Civil Court. Moreover, the Appellate Authority held that the petitioner failed to produce any documentary or circumstantial evidence on record to prove his case that his father was jointly cultivating the suit land as joint tenant along with the respondent No. 3. Accordingly both the appeals were dismissed.