NANA TUKARAM HAVALKAR Vs. CHATURA GOVINDA SHELKE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India takes exception to the order passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Pune dated 27th August, 1987 in Revision Application No. MRT/kp/96/84.

(2.) THE land in question in the present proceeding is admeasuring 8 Acres 20 Gunthas out of Gat No. 37 of Village Talanduge, Taluka Hatkanangale, Dist. Kolhapur. The petitioners claim that they were tenants in respect of the said land prior to 1957 for which reason they had become deemed purchasers on the tillers day (1-4-1957 ). On that premise, application was filed by the petitioners under Section 32g of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act. The Additional Tahsildar and A. L. T. , Hatkanangale by order dated 20th September, 1982 allowed the said application and held that the petitioners were tenants on the tillers day and have become deemed purchasers. As a consequence of that declaration, the authority determined the purchase price in respect of the suit lands and also provided for time to pay the said amount. The first authority, the Tahsildar, for recording the finding that the petitioners were tenants on the tillers day, essentially took into account 7/12 extracts in respect of the disputed land for the last 35 years which clearly indicated that the petitioners were cultivating the suit land as tenants. The Tahsildar also adverted to the fact that the landlords' plea was that the petitioners were partners in cultivation and not tenants. The Tahsildar however, held that the landlords failed to establish that the petitioners were servants within the meaning of Section 4 (i) (b) of the said Act. Accordingly, the application preferred by the petitioners was allowed. The respondents filed appeal before the Sub Divisional Officer, Division Kolhapur being Tenancy Appeal No. 2188/82. The Appellate Authority was pleased to reverse the view taken by the Tahsildar, by its order dated 26th March, 1982. The Appellate Authority was of the view that if the petitioners claimed to be the tenants on the tillers day, there was no justification for the petitioners to take out the proceeding under Section 32g as late as in the year 1981. Moreover, the Appellate Authority was of the view that it is not understood as to why the suo motu proceedings were not started by the A. L. T. on the tillers day. Insofar as entries in 7/12 extracts are concerned, the Appellate Authority discarded the same on the premise that the oral evidence on record would indicate that the status of the Applicant was only that of a servant. The Appellate Authority, while referring to the receipts relating to the sugarcane sold to Kolhapur Sugar Mills purported to have been cultivated in the suit land, was of the view that the receipts have come from the custody of the respondents landlord-which confirms the position that the status of the petitioners was one of the servant and not as a tenant. The Appellate Authority has also adverted to the stand taken by the respondents that the petitioners were not tenants as such but partners in cultivation. However, relying on the oral evidence, the Appellate Authority took the view that the petitioners were cultivating the land only as servants and therefore, cannot be said to be tenants on the tillers day. Accordingly, the appeal preferred by the respondents was allowed. The petitioners carried the matter before Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. The Tribunal moreover or less adopted the same reasons noted by the Appellate Authority for deciding the matter in favour of the respondents. Accordingly, the Revision Application was dismissed. It is against this decision that the present writ petition has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

(3.) THE learned counsel for the petitioners contends that going by the plain language of Section 4 and the stand taken by the respondents before the authorities, the authorities had no option but to hold that the petitioners were lawfully cultivating the suit land belonging to the respondents as tenants on the tillers day. To support this contention reliance is placed on the entries in the 7/12 extracts for the last 35 years which clearly go to show that the land was cultivated by the petitioners. Moreover, strong reliance is placed on the observations made by the authorities below that the petitioners were partners in cultivation. Besides that, it is submitted that, even the documentary as well as the oral evidence on record would support that the petitioners were lawfully cultivating the suit land as servants on crop share basis. It is therefore, contended that the petitioners were deemed tenants within the meaning of Section 4 of the Act. In support of this submission reliance is placed on the decision reported in AIR 1981 SC 695, Harish Chander and Ors. v. Ghisa Ram and Anr. , decision of this Court reported in Vol. 77 Tenancy Law Reporter Page 6 in Dhondu Bapu Surve v. Animdha Yeshwant Vaidya and on Constitution Bench of the Apex Court reported in AIR 1964 SC 1320 in Dahya Lala and Ors. v. Basul Mohamed Abdul Rahim and Ors. . Reliance was also placed on the another decision of the Apex Court reported in 1987 Mh. LJ. (SC) 1114 = Vol. LXXXIX BLR 622 Jagan @ Jagannath Umaji v. Gokuldas Hiralal Tewari. On the other hand the learned counsel for the respondents has supported the view taken by the two courts below. According to him the courts below have recorded finding of fact that the petitioners were not tenants in respect of the suit land and such a finding of fact ought not to be interfered in exercise of writ jurisdiction. In so far as the entries appearing in the 7/12 extracts in the village record are concerned, the learned counsel contends that, besides the name of the petitioners, names of other six persons tenants have been shown, therefore, it will be impermissible to hold that the petitioners were deemed tenants in respect of the entire land. The learned counsel further contends that insofar as the plea that the petitioners were partners in cultivation, the same will have to be understood in the context that sugarcane was cultivated in the suit land. In other words, the lease was for sugarcane cultivation and therefore, the subject provisions of the Act will have no application and the petitioners cannot be declared as deemed purchasers. The learned counsel next contends that the authorities below have consistently found that the petitioners were brought up by the respondents as their family members and therefore, they cannot be said to be tenants within the meaning of Section 4 of the Act. The learned counsel further placed reliance on decision of the Apex Court AIR 1996 SC 223 in Hanmanta Daulappa Nimbal since deceased by his heirs and L. R. S v. Babasaheb Dajisaheb Londhe and contends that mere entries in the revenue records would not confer any right on the petitioners in absence of receipts or written lease in their favour. Reliance is also placed on the decision of the Apex Court reported in AIR 1999 SC 2257, Shaikh Sujat and Anr. v. S. K. Mehaboob to contend that family member cannot be treated as tenant within the meaning of Section 4 of the Act.