R MAHADEVAN IYER Vs. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) IS there just no enforceable deadline for the termination of State Prosecutions, or is an accused committed to suffer in silence indefinitely is such proceedings span decades ? It is to be assumed that the Constitutional guarantee of a right to a speedy trial only envisages that there is due compliance if the proceedings commence within a reasonable time without any possibility of the end being in sight. In other words, where a citizen is faced with the now rather familiar pattern of a case being part heard for an indefinite period of time, would the High Court be justified in exercising its inherent powers to quash such proceedings ? The inherent powers under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 are often exercised for purposes of quashing a proceeding where no, prima facie, case is made out, or where the prospects of a conviction appear to be extremely bleak, or in situations where the machinery of a Criminal Court is being used for a collateral purpose.

(2.) QUASHING of such proceedings is justified on the ground that it constitutes abuse of judicial process. On the same analogy, if it were to be demonstrated that a prosecuting authority commences a trial after the lapse of 3 to 5 years and then proceeds aimlessly for another 12 years, the High Court would be within its authority to quash such a proceeding on the ground that it constitutes abuse of legal process. Such a situation constitutes one more category of cases wherein the High Court can and must exercise its powers for purposes of terminating the proceedings, and ridding the judicial system of such malignant litigation. Inevitably, reasons of a relatively respectable nature are forthcoming, the safest of them being that the trial Court itself was unable to dispose of the proceeding due to pressure of work. Invariably, in these prosecutions, the trial gets sidelined because of the fact that the accused is on bail and the Court has to accord priority to custody cases. Other reasons such as the limitations on the part of the Police or the other prosecution authorities are set out and the inevitable argument canvassed is a situation of "helpessness" in the face of which it is submitted that a seemingly guilty person should not go scot free by default, whatever be the lapses.

(3.) THE obvious answer is that the State, which is prosecuting authority and which is the authority exercising full control over all the aforesaid authorities and departments, is obliged, as of necessity, to create the necessary infrastructure for the purpose of implementing Constitutional guarantees, and if there is failure on its part in this regard, the Constitutional safeguards shall prevail. Articles 20 and 21 of the Constitution prescribe that a citizen shall not be deprived of his liberty except through the procedure prescribed by law and, furthermore, that a person accused of a criminal offence shall be guaranteed a speedy trial. Logically, therefore, if a speedy trial cannot be ensured, the citizens liberty cannot be curtailed and he will, therefore, have to be set free. Where an accused who is facing a trial is in custody or whether he is on bail are matters of little consequence in this regard because the liberty of the citizen is still curtailed completely or partially and this can only be done within the framework of law. It is in this background that the grievance projected by the present petitioner against whom proceedings are pending since the year 1976 and which have far from concluded in 1991 will have to be examined.