LAWS(BOM)-1991-1-71

DILIP LAXMAN KOKARE Vs. S M AMBEDKAR

Decided On January 23, 1991
DILIP LAXMAN KOKARE Appellant
V/S
S.M.AMBEDKAR Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioner, in this case, has challenged the order of externment dated 17-9-1990 as also an appellate order for the State Government dated 22-11-1990 confirming the earlier externment order.

(2.) THE petitioner was served with a notice dated 15-3-1989 by the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Zone-II, Bombay, asking him to show cause as to why action by way of an externment order should not be taken against him. It is unnecessary to set out the grounds on which the proposed action was contemplated because that the solitary ground urged before us by Mr. Nasik, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner is that there has been an abnormal delay in the passing of the externment order and that the delay of approximately 11/4 years vitiates the order passed against the petitioner.

(3.) AS against this, Mr. Chopda, learned A. P. P. appearing for the respondents has drawn our attention to the affidavit of the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Zone-II, filled in reply to the petition. The authorities contend that the delay of approximately 1 1/2 years was occasioned by the petitioner. Unfortunately, certain vague statements has been set out in the affidavit, cumulatively indicating that it was because of the delay on the part of the petitioner and his learned Advocate that the externment proceedings could not be completed. In our view, such an explanation cannot be availed of by the externing authorities for the reason that proceedings by way of an externment order are essentially preventive by nature and the very essence of such proceedings is that they must be expeditiously completed. If the object of externing a particular person is in order to remove him from the scene of his obnoxious activities which are having a detrimental affect in that area, the entire objective gets frustrated if the proceedings are allowed to drag on for an abnormally long period and it cannot then be said, that there exists a livelink between the charges that are levelled and the preventive action that is completed. The enquiry officer was not at all helpless if the petitioner and/or his learned Counsel kept delaying the matter, as alleged. The petitioner was only entitled to a reasonable opportunity of showing cause and if this facility was being misused by dilation of the proceedings, it was the duty of the concerned authority to have enforced due expediency instead of allowing matters to drift.