ANTONY PHILIP DSOUZA Vs. AIR INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India impugning an order dated may 23, 1984 made by the National Industrial Tribunal, Bombay, in Approval Application No. NTB-4 of 1981.

(2.) THE facts leading to the present petition may be summarized as under :-The petitioner was working in the service of the 1st respondent, which is the country's international airline, at Air India Building, Nariman Point, Bombay 400 021. He was in charge of ticketing. On November 2, 1979 the petitioner was served with a charge-sheet alleging misconducts of (i) dishonesty in connection with the business of the Corporation and (ii) breach of Service Rules applicable to the establishment. It was alleged against the petitioner that during the period February 16, 1979 to March 28th 1979, he was duty at the counter in the Booking office of the 1st respondent at Nariman Point an was specifically positioned at the Gulf against counter in the normal shift. It was alleged against him that during this period he had issued a ticket to one Suresh Kumar on February 16, 1979, to one Fatima Bai on February 29, 1979 and on March 28, 1979 to one Solanki Harji and one J. Patel. It was further alleged that, though the petitioner was at the material time, working only in what is known as 'the Gulf Counter', he had, without authority of his Superior Officer, issued the concerned tickets which pertained only to what is known in the 1st respondent's office as 'the Agents Counter'. The further allegation was that in the sales records pertaining to Suresh Kumar and Fatima Bai, although the tickets were issued against the travel agents' voucher, the petitioner had intentionally written in the "sponsor" column "pax" and in the "contact" column "add", suggesting thereby that the passengers had come directly to the airlines and were not sponsored by any travel agent and further that they could be contacted at their addresses. So far as the tickets issued to Solanki Harji and J. Patel are concerned, the allegation was that although these tickets had also been issued against the travel agents' vouchers, the petitioner had, in the sales record, intentionally left blank the columns pertaining to "sponsor" and "address". It was, therefore alleged that though the petitioner was working in the Gulf Counter and as such had no connection with the Agents Counter, he had issued the concerned tickets in favour of the passengers without authority and had thereby diverted to the travel agent the business which would have otherwise come to the 1st respondent. The petitioner gave a detailed written explanation dated November 23, 1979. In his explanation, the petitioner did not dispute the particulars alleged against him as found in the sales record/documents but seriously disputed the inferences sought to be drawn therefrom. He pointed out that he had taken all action well within his duty limitations or "on orders as and when situation demands" or out of his own right to assist and attend to passengers waiting to be attended to when he was positioned at the Gulf Counter. The crux of his case was that the staff in the sales office of the airlines work as a team and assist each other when they find that there is less workload in one sales counter and heavy workload leading to backlog of passengers at other counters. It is important to note that, having indicated this, the petitioner pointed out that the duty officers do not allot work to the traffic assistants their counters depending upon the pressure of work. The petitioner denied that there was any dishonest intention on his part or that he had acted so as to divert the business which was coming to the 1st respondent to any sales agent. Being dissatisfied with the explanation tendered by the petitioner, the 1st respondent held an inquiry into the charges alleged against him. The inquiry was conducted by a Committee of inquiry. Before the Inquiry Committee, although several witness were examined, the evidence of most of them turned out to be irrelevant. For instance, S. A. Lagali, Sr. Vigilance Officer, just appeared at the inquiry and produced the tickets in issue. He also produced certain other tickets which were alleged to have been issued by the petitioner, though they formed no part of the charge, nor was the petitioner's explanation with regard to them ever called for. Thereafter, there was the evidence of Miss Pinto, who was the then Manager-Reservations and Ticket Officer. The evidence of Miss. Pinto was of a general nature and perhaps intended to prove the practice in the establishment. Then, there was the evidence of three other witnesses, K. V. H. Nair, Bharatan and Khosla. The evidence of these witnesses was on an incident which was neither alleged in the charge-sheet, nor had been considered relevant even by the Inquiry Committee. Thereafter the petitioner was subjected to lengthy cross-examination by the Inquiry Committee which runs into about 16 typed pages. At the end of this evidence, the Inquiry Committee came to the finding that both charges with regard to dishonesty in connection with the business of the Corporation and breach of Service Rules applicable to the establishment were established. Consequent upon the finding of guilt recorded against the petitioner, the petitioner was removed from service by an order dated February 27, 1981. At the relevant time, a Preference, No. NTB-1 of 1980, was pending adjudication before the 2nd respondent. The reference pertained to the dispute between the 1st respondent and its workmen, and the petitioner was a workman concerned in the said Reference. The 1st respondent, therefore, made an Application, No. NTB-4 of 1981, before the 2nd respondent under Section 33 (2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, for approval of the order passed against the petitioner. The Petitioner, who was the respondent in the Application, appeared and contested the matter. Although the petitioner had raised number of points with regard to the contravention of the principles of natural justice at the inquiry, he appears to have restricted his contention only to two at the time of arguments. The first contention raised by the petitioner before the 2nd respondent tribunal was that there was enormous delay between the date of the alleged incident and the date on which he had received the charge-sheet and, hence, there was prejudice caused to him. Secondly, it was contended that the findings recorded by the Inquiry Committee were wholly perverse and such as could not have been arrived at any reasonable person on the basis of the evidence on record. The 2nd respondent, by the impugned order dated May 23, 1984, held firstly that the mere fact of delay did not vitiate the charge-sheet and that it was also a case where prejudice has been demonstrated thereby. Secondly, on the question of perversity of the findings, the 2nd respondent rejected the contention and took the view that the conclusion arrived at by the Inquiry committee was not perverse and could have been arrived at by any reasonable person on the basis of the evidence before him. In this view of the matter, he granted approval to the action taken against the petitioner by the impugned order. The petitioner as mentioned before, has impugned the said order of the 2nd respondent-National Industrial Tribunal.

(3.) ON behalf of the petitioner, Mr. Singhvi, learned Counsel stated, at the outset, that, out of the two points raised before the 2nd respondent-tribunal, he would be pressing only the latter one, viz. , that the conclusions of the Inquiry before the Inquiry Committee were perverse. Mr. Singhvi contends that, even taking the evidence before the Inquiry Committee at its highest, no reasonable man could have come to the conclusion that the evidence before the Inquiry Officer could plausibly lead to the conclusion that the petitioner was guilty of dishonesty in connection with the business of the 1st respondent Corporation or that he was guilty of breach of any rules of discipline.