RUPRAO NAGORAO MAHULKAR Vs. MURLIDHAR DAGDUSETH DABHADE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS second appeal raised a short question as to what is meant by the expression "manufacturing purpose" occurring in section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and whether that purpose spoken of in section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act must be at the commencement of the lease and with reference to the lessee or otherwise.

(2.) THE circumstances in which this question has arisen is the commencement of a suit by the landlord respondent before me in the Court of the Civil Judge, (Junior Division) Akola against the appellant -defendant for possession of premises plot No. 10/2, admeasuring 3700 sq. feet in area. The premises originally belonged to one Nagarkar who had leased them to the defendant. The suit was filed by the plaintiff who was transferee from Nagarkar and who got this property in exchange under a deed from Nagarkar. The rent agreed according to the plaintiff was monthly rent of Rs. 58.33 and that that tenancy commenced on the first of every month, according to the Gregorian. Calendar, The tenancy of the defendant was terminated by a notice to quit issued to the defendant on 18th March 1969 requiring him to vacate and deliver possession by the end of April 1969. Ten t -appellant -defendant replied to the notice and claimed that the notice in question which was only a 15 days notice or a notice of a duration of less than six months was not a legal and valid notice. That the property had been leased to him by Nagarkar in the year 1952 for a manufacturing purpose, and, therefore, the notice was bad and invalid.

(3.) BOTH before the trial Court as well as the appellate Court the principal question which was raised was whether the lease in favour of the defendant was a lease for a manufacturing purpose. An incidental and ancillary question which was also raised was, whether in the circumstances and in the absence of a written instrument of lease registered and in writing as contemplated under section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, this defence was open to the defendant at all. It was in that context that the question as to whether the notice in suit was legal or valid was considered and answered by both the Courts. The learned trial Judge came to the conclusion that it was not proved by the defendant -tenant that the lease was for a manufacturing purpose. In that view, no further question arose before him. The appellate Court on the other hand came to the conclusion that the lease was for a composite purpose, namely, for the purpose of residence and for the purpose of workshop which the defendant was carrying on there. In that view, the appellate Court also came to the conclusion that the notice was legal and valid. It is this concurrent finding recorded by the Courts below which is challenged in this second appeal.