(1.) BY this petition the petitioner, who is the Controller of Stores, B. B. and C. I. Rly. , seeks for a writ of certiorari against the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act. Respondent No. 2 was an employee of the B. B. and G. I. Rly. He was employed on May 19, 1944. On January 6, 1960, the District Controller of Stores made an order suspending him from service with effect from January 7, 1950, and on February 4, 1950, the District Controller of Stores passed an order removing respondent No. 2 from service. On April 10, 1950, respondent No. 2 filed an application in the Court of the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act for a direction to the petitioner under Section 15 of the Act to pay a sum of Rs. 253-10-0 as delayed wages for the period February 4, 1950, to March 81, 1950. Subsequent to that other applications were filed for the payment of delayed wages by respondent No. 2 for periods subsequent to March 31, 1950. An objection was taken on behalf of the petitioner that the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act had no jurisdiction to decide the applications of respondent No. 2 in view of the contentions raised by the petitioner. That contention was rejected and the Authority adjudicated upon the claim of respondent No. 2 and passed orders directing the petitioner to pay wages as claimed by respondent No. 9.
(2.) IN this case the contention of the petitioner is that the contract of service between respondent No. 2 and the B. B. and C. I. Rly. was validly terminated on February 4, 1950, and the petitioner's further contention is that after February 4, 1950, respondent No. 2 ceased to be a servant of the B. B. and C. I. Rly. , and the relationship of master and servant between them came to an end or, in other words, after February 4, 1950, there was no subsisting contract of service between the B. B. and G. I. Rly. and respondent No. 2. The contention of respondent No. 2, on the other hand, was that he being a Government servant his tenure in office was protected and he could not be dismissed in the manner in which the B. B. and C. I. Rly. had purported to dismiss him. Therefore, he contended that he continued to be in the service of the B. B. and C. I. Rly. and he was entitled to payment of wages.
(3.) THE question which arises for our consideration is whether looking to the terms of the Payment of Wages Act (iv of 1936), it is competent to the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act to direct payment of wages when it is disputed that there is a subsisting contract of service between the employer and his employee. Is it open to the Authority to decide whether a contract of service has been properly and validly terminated? Is it open to him to decide that the dismissal of a servant by his master is wrongful? In order to decide this question, it is necessary to look at the purpose of the Payment of Wages Act and also its general provisions. As the preamble itself says, the purpose of the Act was to regulate the payment of wages to certain class of persons employed in the industry, and the application of the Act was restricted to wages payable in respect of a wage period which over such wage period averaged Rs. 200 a month or less. "wages" are defined as meaning all remuneration capable of being expressed in terms of money which would, if the terms of the contract of employment expressed or implied were fulfilled, be payable whether conditional upon the regular attendance, good work or conduct or other behaviour of the person employed or otherwise to a person employed in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment. Therefore it is clear that as far as this part of the definition is concerned wages are to be construed as remuneration due to a person who is employed and it is remuneration which is payable under the terms of the contract whether express or implied. The definition goes on to mention certain other attributes which according to the Legislature would also constitute remuneration to a person as wages, and that further inclusive definition is :