BHAICHAND TARACHAND Vs. STATE OF BOMBAY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a petition filed by certain members of the Digambar Jain community of Akluj in the Sholapur District. At Akluj there is a Jain Temple, and the question that is raised by this petition is whether the Harijans are entitled to enter this temple by reason of the Bombay Harijan Temple Entry Act, 1947. That Act was placed on the statute book in order to remove certain disabilities from which the Harijans suffered, and one of the moat glaring disabilities was that Harijans were not allowed to worship along with other Hindus in Hindu temples. The contention of Mr. Das is that on a true constitution of this Act, if Hindus had a right by law or custom to worship in this particular temple, then the Harijans would have a similar right. But if Hindus themselves have no right to enter into this temple, then no right has been conferred upon the Harijans by this Act. The contention, on the other hand, put forward on behalf of the State by the Advocate-General is that this Act throws open all Jain temples to all the Hindus, and inasmuch as Jain temples are thrown open to all the Hindus, the right that the Hindus have by virtue of this Act can also be exercised by the Harijans.

(2.) In order to decide which of these two conditions is sound, it is necessary to look both at the purpose and object of the Act and also to the language used by the Legislature in order to effectuate that object and purpose. Section 2 is the definition section and the material definition we have to consider is the definition of "Hindus" and of "Temple." "Hindus" is defined as including Jains, and "temple" is defined as a place, by whatever name known and to whomsoever belonging, which is used as a place of religious worship, by custom, usage or otherwise by the members of the Hindu community or any section thereof and includes all land appurtenant thereto and subsidiary shrines attached to any such place. Section 3 is the material section which confers certain rights upon Harijans, and that is in the following terms:

(3.) The other consequence of the Advocate-General's argument being accepted would be that this Act confers rights upon high class Hindus which they did not possess before the passing of this Act, because according to the Advocate-General after this Act was passed every Hindu became entitled to enter a Jain temple even though he did not have such a right before the passing of this statute. That construction also, in our opinion, is totally opposed to the object and purpose of this legislation. This legislation was not passed in order to confer any rights upon high class Hindus. It was passed solely for the purpose of removing disabilities of Harijans. The definition of "temple" also lends support to the construction we are placing upon the statue, because a temple is defined as a place of religious worship which is so by custom, usage or otherwise. That means that if a temple is permitted by Jains to he used by the Hindus, then undoubtedly it would fall in the definition of "temple" as used in this Act. Mr. Das concedes that if in this particular Jain temple Hindus are permitted to worship by reason of custom or usage, then the Harijans would be equally entitled to worship in this temple. But the Advocate-General is asking for a higher right for Hindus, and that right is that although by law or by custom a Hindu was not entitled to worship in a Jain temple, by reason of this Act he became so entitled. That contention we are not prepared to accept.