K U KULKARNI Vs. GANPAT HIRAJI TELL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THESE are two second appeals from a decision of the District Judge of Jalgaon reversing the order of the Joint First Class Subordinate Judge of that District directing that the earnings of the insolvent-respondent No, 1 vested in the receiver in insolvency inasmuch as they were not "wages of a labourer " within the protective provisions of Clause (h) of Section 60 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. The learned District Judge held that the earnings were protected as the respondent was a labourer. The receiver and one of the creditors of the insolvent have filed separate appeals against that decision.

(2.) A preliminary objection has been taken on behalf of the insolvent that no second appeal lies against the District Judge's order. That objection is untenable because the question whether the earnings of an insolvent would or would not vest in the receiver under Section 28, Clause (5), of the Provincial Insolvency Act, has to be decided by the Insolvency Court under the provisions of Section 4 of that Act which expressly provides for a second appeal.

(3.) WHAT is urged is that the term ' salary' includes the ' wages of labourers',. and that consequently the latter are subject to exemption to the extent stated in the latter part of Clause (h) of Section 6 0. T'hat argument assumes that the legislature used the two analogous words ' wages' and ' salary' in the same sense. According to Maxwell " where analogous words are used each may be presumed to be susceptible of a separate and distinct meaning, for the legislature is not supposed to use words without a meaning." (Interpretation "of Statutes, 8th Ed., p. 276). The legislature, in my opinion, must always be; presumed to aim at precision and in so doing would naturally follow the safe rule of always calling the same thing by the same name. If it has used two different expressions, though analogous in nature, in different parts of the same clause, it must be assumed that they were intended to be used in a different sense. The legislature was obviously enacting for a special class of wage earners as opposed to the general class of people earning a living when it stated that wages of labourers or domestic servants which are payable in money or kind are exempt from attachment. The Court is, therefore, bound to follow the general rule that special expressions take from things general. Where there are general words in the later clause capable of reasonable' application without being extended to the subject specially dealt with by the earlier clause and in the absence of any indication of any particular intention to that effect, the presumption would be in my opinion that the legislature did not intend by the use of the general expression to repeal or reduce the effect of the earlier and special clause or qualify it in any sense by taking away a particular privilege of a particular class of persons. Having regard to the proper operation of the expression used the general clause must be construed in a distinct sense. If, as was argued, the term 'salary' must include the wages of a labourer, then evidently, if it was a controlling clause, the first clause was redundant. The rule of construction avoids absurdity or redundancy in a legislative enactment. I was referred to the following expression of opinion of Biswas J. in the case of Jnanendra Kumar v. Akash Chandra [1938] A.I.R. Cal. 325 where the question raised was whether a head clerk in a tea shop earned salary or wages and whether the term ' salary' bore a restrictive interpretation. I do not however desire to express any final opinion on the point. All that I need say is that from the collocation of the words used in this clause it is fairly arguable that the word ' salary' is intended to mean salary of labourers and domestic servants only.