MITHA RUSTOMJI MURZBAN Vs. NUSSERWANJI NOWROJI ENGINEER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a suit for damages for defamation consisting partly of libel and partly of slander, and for an injunction restraining the defendant, his servants and agents and each and every of them from further printing, circulating, distributing or otherwise publishing the said libels and/or slanders or any similar libels and/or slanders affecting the plaintiff.

(2.) THE words complained of as libel are set out in paragraph 7 of the plaint, and were printed and published by the defendant in the issue of the Kom Sevak of September 22, 1940, a weekly journal in Gujarati published every Sunday, which was started by him sometime about the end of 1935. Defendant stated that he and his sons were the owners of the paper in partnership, and: that he himself was the editor, printer and publisher. THE paper is mostly read by members of the Parsi community, but has a circulation also amongst members of the other communities. THE words complained of as slander are also mentioned in para. 7 of the plaint, and were, according to the plaintiff, spoken by the defendant in reference to her at a public meeting held in Sir Cowasji Jehangir Hall, Bombay, on September 26, 1940. THE defendant has put in a very long and prolix written statement containing matters which are mostly irrelevant to the issues in the suit. THE publication of the words complained of as libel is not denied; but the defence is that the words are a fair and bonafide comment on a matter of public interest, and also that they were published on a privileged occasion. With regard to the words complained of as slander, the defendant denied that he uttered the words referred to by the plaintiff, and that if he did, they were spoken on a privileged occasion. In any event he contends that they are not actionable per se, that is, without proof of special, damage.

(3.) SECTION 499, Explanation 4, of the Indian Penal Code, attempts a more detailed explanation or description of what a defamatory statement is; but the principle is the same. It is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove that the words, are false. If the words are defamatory, they are presumed to be false, and it is for the defendant if he seeks to justify them to prove that they are substantially true. It is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove any malice on the part of the defendant. It is only for the purpose of rebutting the defence of qualified privilege that it becomes necessary to prove express malice in the sense of improper motive on the part of the defendant.