STATE OF MAHARASHTRA Vs. WASUDEO MADHUKARRAO PANDE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Original Application No.170 of 2015, on the file of the Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal, Bench at Nagpur (hereafter "the Tribunal", for short) has been allowed by a judgment and order dated January 24, 2019. By presenting this writ petition, the petitioners (who were the respondents in the said original application) have laid a challenge to such judgment and order.

(2.) The facts reveal that the respondent, who was the original applicant before the Tribunal, was suspended by an order dated September 30, 1999, in contemplation of disciplinary proceedings. Such order of suspension stood revoked on January 12, 2001 and, accordingly, the respondent resumed service. More than five years later, on February 3, 2006 to be precise, charge-sheet memorandum was issued against the respondent by the petitioner no.3. The six charges levelled against the respondent, inter alia, included a charge accusing him of having indulged in irregularities in discharge of official duties while he was working at Nagbhid during 1998-99 under the control of the Sub-Divisional Soil Conservation Officer, Bramhapuri, resulting in misappropriation of Government funds. The respondent replied to the charge-sheet on March 27, 2006. An inquiry followed. The Inquiry Officer in his report dated October 22, 2008 held that four of the six charges levelled against the respondent stood proved. The report of inquiry being furnished to the respondent, he submitted a detailed reply dated April 13, 2009. More than forty-two months after submission of such reply, the Disciplinary Authority of the respondent passed an order of penalty dated November 3, 2012 directing recovery of Rs.1,94,497/- from the respondent as well as reducing two of his increments permanently. This order was followed by a further order dated December 23, 2013, whereby the period between October 18, 1999 and January 18, 2001 spent by the respondent under suspension was directed to be treated as a period under suspension. In the meanwhile, however, the respondent retired from service on attaining the age of superannuation on November 30, 2012. It is these orders dated November 3, 2012 and December 23, 2013 that formed the subject-matter of challenge in the said original application before the Tribunal, which stood allowed as noticed above.

(3.) The Tribunal set aside the impugned orders dated November 3, 2012 and December 23, 2013 on the sole ground that the respondent was deprived of 'fair hearing' in course of the disciplinary proceedings initiated against him. The Tribunal observed that ordinarily when a final order is set aside on the ground that the delinquent-employee was not afforded 'fair hearing', the Disciplinary Authority is granted liberty to proceed from the stage the inquiry or the proceedings, as the case may be, stood vitiated. However, since the respondent had retired from service, subjecting him to face the inquiry afresh, at this distance of time, would result in great injustice. Considering such aspects, the Tribunal did not grant liberty to the Disciplinary Authority and allowed the said original application in terms of prayer clauses 5(2), (3) and (4). Consequently, the impugned orders dated November 3, 2012 and December 23, 2013 were set aside and the period spent under suspension by the respondent was directed to be treated as period spent on duty. There was a further direction for grant of all retiral benefits to the respondent, which he was entitled to upon superannuation.