(1.) In this group of writ petitions, the petitioners who are members of the managing committees of the Co-operative Credit Societies, have challenged the jurisdiction of the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (for short "the Act") to pass orders against them in the complaints filed by the depositors against co-operative credit societies on the following grounds :
(2.) On the other hand, Mr. Nargolkar, learned Additional Government Pleader as well as Mr. Ingle, learned counsel appearing for some of the complainants have opposed the writ petitions and submitted that the petitioners have an equally efficacious remedy available to them under the Consumer Protection Act. It is submitted that either the petitioners can go back to the District Consumer Redressal Forum and raise the contentions which are now sought to be raised in these writ petitions or the petitioners can go before the State Commission under section 17(l)(b) of the Consumer Protection Act.
(3.) Though in some of the petitions, the petitioners have challenged the validity of the Act and in particular the proviso to section 15, which provides that no appeal shall be entertained by the State Commission unless the appellant has deposited in the prescribed manner 50% of the amount awarded or Rs. 25,000/-whichever is less, the point was not urged before us, and in our view rightly so, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Shyam Kishore and others vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and anr., 1993 1 SCC 22. Therein, the Supreme Court was inter alia considering the validity of section 170 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act which provides that no appeal against an assessment of any tax shall be heard or determined unless the amount, if any, in dispute in the appeal has been deposited by the appellant in the office of Corporation. The challenge to the provision on the ground that it was harsh and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India was repelled by the Supreme Court holding that the appellate authority may admit the appeal and grant adjournment in appropriate cases to enable the appellant to deposit taxes but cannot commence the hearing without pre-deposit of the tax. So interpreted, the provision would not be harsh and violative of Article 14. In Dinkar Bapuso Patil and ors. vs. The State of Maharashtra and ors., Writ, Petition No. 5881 of 2010, following the abovementioned decision of the Supreme Court, a Division Bench of this Court has repelled the challenge to the constitutional validity of the second proviso to section 15 of the Act. Consequently, the issue does not survive and was not rightly urged before us.