(1.) These Appeals can be disposed of by a common Judgment as the same arise out of a common Judgment delivered by the Reference Court in References under section 28-A(3) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as "the said Act"). By the impugned Judgment, the Reference Court held that the References under section 28-A(3) made at the instance of the Appellants were barred by limitation and, therefore, the said References have been dismissed. It is an admitted position that in case of these 10 Appeals, Awards under section 28-A(2) were made on 5th April, 1994 and notices under section 12(2) of the said Act in respect of the Awards were served on the appellants on 5th April, 1994. On applications made by the Appellants, certified copies of the awards were received by them on 15th April 1994. The Reference Applications under section 28-A(3) were admittedly filed on 21st May, 1992. The admitted position is that if the period of limitation for filling Applications for References under section 28-A(3) is to be computed from the date of service of notices under section 12(2) i. e. from 5th April, 1994, and if it is assumed that the period of limitation is of six weeks from the date of service of notices of Award under sub-section (2) of section 28, the Reference Applications were barred by limitation. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants has made two submissions. The first submission is on interpretation of section 28A of the said Act. He submitted that sub-section (1) of section 28A confers the power on the Collector to redetermine the compensation on the basis of an Award made by the Reference Court under section 18 of the said Act in respect of a land acquired under the same notification under section 4(1). He submitted that proviso to subsection (1) specifically extends the period of limitation for filing an application for redetermination by providing that the time required for obtaining the certified copy of the Award of the Reference Court is required to be excluded while computing the period of limitation of three months provided in sub-section (1)of section 28A. He submitted that though a decision contemplated by sub-section (2) of section 28A is referred to as an Award, it is not an offer on par with an Award under section 11 of the said Act and in fact it is an Award made after adjudication as contemplated by sub-section (1) of section 28A. It is submitted that on plain reading of sub-section (1) of section 28A, the Award under sub-section (2) thereof cannot be an offer, but it is a decision on adjudication made for redetermination of the compensation on the basis of the Award of the Reference Court. He submitted that there is no provision made on par with subsection (2) of section 12 requiring notice of the Award under sub-section (2) of section 28A to be served to the persons interested. He invited the attention of the Court to sub-section (3) of section 28A. He submitted that though the provisions of sections 18 to 28 of the said Act, so far as may be, apply to Reference Applications under section 28-A (3), he submitted that all provisions incorporated under section 18 will not apply to a Reference Application under sub-section (3) of section 28A. He invited the attention of the Court to section 18 of the said Act and in particular proviso (a) and proviso (b) to sub-section (2) thereof. He submitted that the first part of proviso (b) provides a limitation of six weeks from the date of receipt of the notice under sub-section (2) of section 12. He submitted that as an Award under sub-section (2) of section 28A does not contemplate service of any notice on par with a notice under sub-section (2) of section 12, the first part of proviso (b) providing limitation will have no Application. He urged that in a case where the person making an Application under section 28-A(1) was not present before the Collector at the time of passing the Award under subsection (2), the period of limitation will be six months from the date of the Award. He stated that in the cases in hands, the period of limitation will be of six months from the date of Award and the Applications for References have filed within the said period of six months.
(2.) He submitted that the period of limitation provided for an Application under section 18 cannot be mechanically applied to a Reference Application under sub-section (3) of section 28A as all the provisions of section 18 are not applicable to a Reference under sub-section (3) of section 28A. He submitted that the remedies under sections 18 and 28A are distinct remedies and, therefore, the same may provide for different periods of limitation. He placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of The Bihar State Co-operative Societies Marketing Union Ltd. vs. Uma Shankar Sharan and another, 1993 AIR(SC) 1222. In short, the submission is that in case of Reference Application under sub-section (3) of section 28A, when the claimant is not present at the time of making an Award, the period of limitation will be six months from the date of the Award and the period of limitation will start from the date of Award under subsection (2) of section 28A.
(3.) The second limb of argument is based on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Punjab vs. Mst. Qaisar Jehan Begum and another, 1963 AIR(SC) 1604. He submitted that the limitation will start running only from the date on which the contents of the Award under section 28-A(2) are effectively communicated to a claimant. He states that the essential and material contents of the Award under section 28-A(2) were made known to the appellants-claimants in these cases on 15th April, 1994 when certified copies of the Awards were made available to the appellants. He submitted that if the period of limitation is computed from 15th April, 1994, the Reference Applications were filed during the stipulated time of six weeks. He relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Ambya Kalya Mhatre (Deceased through LR's) vs. The State of Maharashtra decided on 12th September, 2011 in Civil Appeal No. 7784 of 2011 [since reported in 2012(1) Mh. L. J. (S. C. ) 9], Relying upon the said decision, he submitted in a Reference Application, it is not necessary to make any specific prayer for claiming any specific market value.