LOTAN FAKIRA PATIL Vs. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) HEARD the learned Advocates for the parties. Perused the records.

(2.) THE petitioner challenges the order dated 10th November, 1984 passed by the Additional Commissioner, Nasik Division, Nasik in Ceiling Revision Case No. 137/82. Pursuant to the necessary declaration filed under the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961, an inquiry was held under section 14 r/w 21 thereof by the Additional Tahsildar in relation to the land owned by the petitioner. By order dated 23-2-1976, the declaration was issued in favour of the petitioner to the effect that the petitioner is not holder of any surplus land. The said order of declaration of no surplus land was reviewed by the Commissioner, Bombay Division by its order dated 28-10-1977 in Revision Case No. 181/76 and the matter was remanded for fresh inquiry. The Additional Tahsildar again by order dated 3-7-1978 declared that the petitioner was not having any surplus land. The Collector of Dhule thereafter, on scrutinising the papers, by a letter dated 17-6-1980 forwarded the case to the Commissioner for review of the matter on the ground that the petitioner was holder of surplus land. On receipt of the said letter, the Additional Commissioner of Nasik Division, Nasik, scrutinised the case records and prima facie, having found the petitioner to be holder of surplus land, issued notice on 25-3-1982 to the petitioner in that regard and after hearing the parties, passed the impugned order holding that the petitioner is holder of 57 acres, 07 gunthas of land which is in excess of the ceiling limit of 54 acres of land and, therefore, he was holder of surplus land to the tune of 3 acres and 7 gunthas. The order was passed on 10th November, 1984. Hence, the present petition.

(3.) THE impugned order is sought to be challenged on three grounds. Firstly, the revisional jurisdiction under section 45 of the said Act could not have been invoked beyond the period of three years and the order of the Additional Tahsildar which was sought to be reviewed by the impugned order, was passed on 3-7-1978 whereas, the revisional powers were invoked on 25-3-1982 and, therefore, the entire exercise of revisional authority was without jurisdiction being beyond the time prescribed under section 45 of the said Act. Secondly, it was contended that even assuming that there is no time prescribed for exercise of review powers, the same could have been exercised within reasonable time and the period of four years cannot be considered as the reasonable time for exercising such powers. Thirdly, on merits it was submitted that the records disclose that the petitioner is holder of 47 acres and 7 gunthas of land and that an area of 10 acres of land is sought to be credited to account of the petitioner, which in fact, belongs to the sister of the petitioner and necessary documentary evidence in that regard was misconstrued by the revisional authorities. Reliance is sought to be placed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in support of his contention in the decision of the Apex Court in the matter of (State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha and others), reported in A. I. R. 1969 S. C. 1297 and (Mohamad Kavi Mohamad Amin v. Fatmabai Ibrahim), reported in 1997 (6) S. C. C. 71 as also on the decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the matter of (Bansilal Ramgopal Bhattad v. State of Maharashtra and others), reported in 2000 (Supp.) Bom. C. R. 350 : 2000 (1) Mh. L. J. 68. On the other hand, the learned Assistant Government Pleader for the respondents, placing reliance on the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in the matter of (Manohar Ramchandra Manapure and others v. State of Maharashtra and another), reported in 1989 Mh. L. J. 1011, submitted that the records apparently disclose the revisional powers having been invoked within the period of limitation prescribed under section 45 of the said Act, and therefore, there is no substance in the contention of the petitioner that the revisional powers were exercised beyond the period of limitation and in the facts and circumstances of the case, question of contending that the review powers ought to have been invoked within reasonable periods does not arise at all in view of the fact that section 45 of the said Act does specifically provides the period of limitation. On merits, according to the learned A. G. P. for respondents, the revisional authority correctly appreciated the materials on record and, therefore, it does not warrant interference.