SYED NASIRUDDIN KARIMUDDIN Vs. N B SHAIKH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioner challenges the judgment and order dated 2nd January, 1986 in Appeal No. 66 of 1983 by the School Tribunal, Amrawati and Aurangabad. the contention of the petitioner is that the termination of the petitioner from the services from the employment with the respondent No. 1 in spite of being contrary to the procedure prescribed by Tribunal has illegally upheld the same and, therefore, has rendered the judgment and order which is bad in law.

(2.) THE first ground of the challenge to the impugned judgment of the Tribunal is that the Tribunal ignoring the provisions of law contained in terms of section 5 (2) of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977, and the protection available to the petitioner thereunder, has held that the petitioner was not a permanent employee and, therefore, is not entitled for protection in terms of the said provisions of law and that, therefore, no fault can be found with the order of termination of the petitioner issued by the respondent-Management. According to the learned Advocate there was neither any enquiry held before the termination of the services of the petitioner nor even the basic principles of natural justice were followed but the same was totally overlooked by the school Tribunal. Secondly, it is contended that from the defence before the Tribunal it was apparent that the termination of services was by way of punishment on account of alleged misconduct on the part of the petitioner during his employment in the school and being so it was mandatory for the management to serve necessary charge-sheet and to hold enquiry into the allegation of misconduct by the petitioner and thereafter to arrive at the appropriate decision in the matter. Having not done so and the same having been ignored by the Tribunal while confirming the order of termination, the Tribunal has acted illegally and arbitrarily. It is also contended that the stand taken by the management before the Tribunal apparently discloses inconsistent pleas inasmuch at one point it was stated that the petitioner was terminated from service since January 1981, at the same time it was contended that the petitioner resigned from his services in January 1981. Simultaneously, it was also contended that the services of the petitioner were terminated on account of misconduct of the petitioner. These inconsistent pleas sufficiently disclosed arbitrary exercise on the part of the respondents in the matter of termination of the services of the petitioner. However, the same also has been totally ignored by the school Tribunal. Reliance is placed in the decision of the Apex Court in the matter of (Chandra Prakash Shahi v. State of U. P. and others), reported in A. I. R. 2000 S. C. W. 1816, (D. K. Yadav v. J. M. A. Industries Ltd.), reported in 1993 (II) C. L. R. 116, (V. P. Ahuja v. State of Punjab and others), reported in A. I. R. 2000 S. C. W. 792 and (Prabhakar Shrikrishna Kokade v. Adivasi Magaswarg Shikshan Mandal Sindewahi), reported in 1993 Mh. L. J. 375. On the other hand, it is contended on behalf of the management that the petitioner was not a permanent employee and before terminating his services 2 notices were served upon the petitioner calling upon the petitioner to show cause as to why action should not be taken against him, one on 14-10-1980 and other on 25-11-1980 and yet no reply was filed by the petitioner. Thereafter, the management had taken decision to terminate the petitioner. It was further contended that the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Services) Regulation Act, 1977 same into force with effect from 15th July, 1981 and, therefore, the provisions of the said Act were not applicable at the relevant time. However, the management had followed the principles of natural justice. Besides it is also contended that in the course of appeal necessary affidavits of the witnesses in support of the managements case were filed and the Head Master was subjected to the cross-examination by the petitioner. Considering the said materials before the Tribunal, the Tribunal has held that the petitioner was liable to be terminated and therefore has refused to interfere with the order of termination of the services of the petitioner. It was further contended that considering the nature of allegations against the petitioner it was not necessary for the petitioner to examine the girls or the ladies who were the victims of the alleged misbehaviour on the part of the petitioner and in that connection reliance is sought to be placed in the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the matter of (Kumarnagar Social Welare Center, Dhule v. Vinayak Yadave Patil), reported in 1993 (1) Mah. L. R. 156. It was also contended that considering the fact that the matter is being considered in exercise of the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the scope of the petition is very limited and in that connection reliance is placed in the decision of the Apex Court in the matter of (Dharangadhra Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra and others), reported in A. I. R. 1957 S. C. 264, and (The State of Orissa and another v. Murlidhar Jena), reported in A. I. R. 1963 S. C. 404.

(3.) IT cannot be disputed that the scope of powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is very limited. Indeed, the Apex Court in Dharangadhra Chemicals case has clearly ruled that in the matters where the Industrial Tribunal has jurisdiction to decide the question sought to be raised by the parties before it and on appreciation of the materials placed before it, arrives at its own conclusion in respect thereof, the High Court exercising its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is not competent to set aside any such finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal. So also in State of Orissa v. Murlidhar Jenas case the Apex Court has held that in proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 the High Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by a competent Tribunal, in a departmental enquiry. If the High Court purports to reapprreciate the evidence for itself, then it amount to travelling beyond the scope of its jurisdiction. However, if it is shown that the impugned findings records by the Administrative Tribunal are not supported by any evidence, the High Court would be justified in setting aside the findings.