(1.) BY this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner company has challenged the legality and validity of both the first and second awards of the Presiding Officer, First Labour Court, Bombay dated 7th October 1986 and 6th November 1987 under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The petitioner, a company, employs about 250 workmen. The first respondent is the Presiding Officer, First Labour Court, Bombay and is, thus, a formal party. The second respondent is the General Secretary, Maharashtra General Kamgar Union, 252 Janta Colony, Ramnarayan Narkar Marg, Ghatkopar, (E), Bombay. The six workmen Sarvashri (1) Vishnu Tukaram (2) Barkatali Ashrafali (3) Lingappa Sakharam (4) Madhukar Bhiwa (5) Madhukar Eknath and (6) Vasant Bhiwa were working with the petitioner company for quite some time. They were charge-sheeted and suspended under separate orders dated 28th December 1982. Except Lingappa Sakharam, all other workmen were charge-sheeted under Clauses 23 (b), 23 (k), 23 (I) and 23 (c) of the Certified Standing Orders of the petitioner company. Shri Lingappa Sakharam was charge-sheeted under clauses 23 (b), 23 (k) and 23 (1) of the Certified Standing Orders. It is common ground that no subsistence allowance was paid to the workmen during the period of suspension. Departmental Enquiry was held by the management despite protests on behalf of the workmen. By order dated 24th February, 1983 the workmen were dismissed from service.
(2.) THE Deputy Commissioner of Labour made reference to the Labour Court under section 10 (1) and section 12 (5) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The claim of the workmen was for reinstatement with full back wages and continuity of service with effect from 24th February 1983. The Union i. e. the respondent No. 2 herein appeared as party before the Labour Court on behalf of the workmen. The Labour Court passed its first Award on 7th October 1986. The issues framed in the Award were two namely :---
(3.) IT is contended by Shri John, the learned Counsel for the petitioner company that in the absence of specific issue framed the Labour Court ought not to have gone into the question whether the petitioner was or was not under an obligation to pay any subistence allowance during the period of suspension and whether the non-payment of it amounted to denial of opportunity in the conduct of enquiry proceedings. Having regard to the fact that the Certified Standing Orders did not contain any provision for payment of subsistence allowance during the period of suspension and that model standing order or any other provision does not automatically have the effect of modifying the certified standing orders he argued, the conclusion arrived at by the Labour Court in this regard was unwarranted and illegal. In particular he pointed out that non-payment of subsistence allowance in the present case did not and could not amount to denial of proper opportunity as the departmental enquiry itself was over within about two months from the order of suspension. He submitted that it was, therefore, not correct conclude that the departmental enquiry was vitiated. Shri John further argued that the dispute referred to is also not an industrial dispute within the meaning of section 2 (k) of the Industrial Disputes Act as the respondent union had failed to prove that it was representing a substantial number of workmen at the time the reference was made. The conclusion in the second Award that all the allegations regarding the misconduct referred to incidents outside the factory premises and therefore outside the scope of industrial dispute, Shri John stated, was wholly unjustified in view of the Supreme Court decision in the case of (Glaxo Laboratories (I) Ltd. v. Labour Court, Meerut and others) A. I. R. 1984. S. C. 22. On the evidence recorded by the Labour Court the conclusion that the assault took place in front of the gate of the factory and had a direct causal connection with the misconduct and the employment was, according to Shri John, obvious. He submitted that both the Awards required to be quashed. In the alternative, he submitted that the case be remanded to the Labour Court with direction to give a finding as to the nature of the as to the nature of the assault and whether the same had causal connection between the misconduct and the employment and whether such a connection was real and substantial and not remote or tenuous.