BAPURAO DHONDIBA Vs. NEROJI RAMJI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS second appeal raises a short question relating to the rights of the reversioners to challenge the alienation effected by a Hindu widow prior to the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act. The respondent No. 4 Sarja Bai, who was the widow of Irba and whose property she had inherited as a Hindu widow on his death, effected a sale-deed in respect of some of the properties in favour of the appellants on 29th August 1953. The respondents 1 to 3, who are the sons of the cousins of Irba claiming to be the next reversioners to the estate filed the present suit for a declaration that the sale-deed effected by respondent No. 4 in favour of the appellants was without any consideration and without legal necessity and did not affect the rights of the next reversioners in respect of the property comprised in the sale-deed. The suit was resisted by the appellants, who were the alienees on the ground that tile alienation had been effected by Sarjabai for the payment of antecedent debts of the husband and was, therefore, good and valid and justified by necessity. The suit was filed on 20th October 1953 and was decided in the plaintiff's favour and the trial Court granted them the declaration which they had prayed for. Against the decree of the trial Court the appellants and Sarjabai filed an appeal in the Court of the District and Sessions Judge at Parbhani. The appeal, however, was dismissed on 6th July 1955 and the decree passed by the trial Court was confirmed. The appellants then filed the present second appeal in the High Court, against the decision and decree of the lower appellate Court. During the pendency of the appeal on 17th June 1950 the Hindu Succession Act of 1956 became applicable and it is contended in the present second appeal relying on certain provisions of the said Act that the suit by the reversioners is not maintainable and, therefore, must be dismissed.

(2.) NOW there can be no doubt that the appellate Court is entitled to take into account any change in the law which has taken place during the pendency of the litigation. If, therefore, the contention which is sought to be raised on behalf of the appellants is available to them under the Hindu Succession Act, they are entitled to raise it in the present second appeal. Now, the contention which has been raised by Mr. Deshpande for the appellants is that the result of the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act is that the limited estate which was known to the Hindu law as the Hindu Women's Estate or the Hindu Widow's estate, has been done away with and has been substituted by full ownership in the Hindu female. The reversioners also have been done away with under the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act so that no reveisioners exist who are in a position to challenge the alienation as under the customary Hindu Law. Mr. Deshpande argues that it may be that at the date when the suit was filed by the present plaintiffs they had the right to challenge the alienation. Their right, however, has disappeared during the pendency of the legation and they, therefore, will not be now entitled to the declaration which they had prayed in the suit and which was given to them by the decree of the trial Court.

(3.) IN order to appreciate this contention which has been raised by Mr. Deshpande, it is necessary to consider the relevant provisions of the Hindu Succession Act and their true legal effect. The provision of the Hindu Succession Act which enlarges the right of the Hindu female is contained in Section 14 of the Act. That section states: