ANJANABAI YESHWANT RAO Vs. YESHWANTRAO DAULATRAO DUDHE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE question referred to the Full Bench is:

(2.) ON behalf of the respondents, it has been urged that this section does not apply, in view of the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 29 is as follows:

(3.) MR. Mandlekar has contended that even it Sub-section (4) of Section 417 is a special law within Sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act, this Sub-section (2) can only apply where, as stated in the Sub-section, the special law prescribes a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the first schedule. The first schedule to the Limitation Act does not prescribe any period of limitation for an application for special leave from an order of acquittal. Mr. Mandlekar has therefore contended that the period prescribed by Sub-section (4) of Section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code cannot be said to be different from that laid down in the first schedule to the Limitation Act. He has relied upon a decision of a single Judge of the Madras High Court In re, Viswanathan Chettiar, (S) AIR 1957 Mad 300 and of the Ajmer Judicial Commissioner's Court in Moti Lal v. Thandirani, AIR 1951 Ajmer 52. A contrary view has however been taken by a Division Bench of this Court in Canara Bank Ltd. v. The Warden Insurance Co. Ltd. 54 Bom LR 661: (AIR 1953 Bom 35 ). In that case at page 662 (of RLR): (at p. 36 of AIR) it was observed: