CHANDBEG MURADBEG Vs. RAJE MADHAORAO DEVIDASRAO JAHAGIRDAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE questions referred to the Full Bench are: (1) Whether having regard to the facts in these appeals the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region and Kutch Area) Act, 1958, (Bombay Act No. XCIX of 1958), apply? and 2. Whether this Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeals in view of the questions raised under the Act or they lie within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Revenue Authorities ?

(2.) THESE questions have been formulated in very wide terms. Clause (b) of Sub-section (3) of section 132 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region and Kutch Area) Act, 1958, (Bombay Act No. XCIX of 1958) (hereinafter referred to as the Tenancy Act) provides that in the case of any proceeding under any of the provisions of the enactments repealed by this Act, pending before a civil Court on the date of the commencement of the Act, the provisions of section 125 of the Act shall apply. Sub-section (1) of section 125 requires a civil Court to stay the proceedings and refer such issues as under the Act are required to be decided by an authority specified in the Act, to such authority for determination. Sub-section (2) provides that after the competent authority has decided the issues referred to it, it shall communicate its decision to the civil Court and such Court shall thereupon dispose of the suit in accordance with the procedure applicable thereto. The jurisdiction of the civil Court to hear the proceedings before it has therefore, not been Completely taken away by Section 132 read with section 125 of the Act. In consultation with the learned Advocates for the parties, we have, therefore, reformulated the question for our consideration as follows:-

(3.) IN order to answer this question, it will be necessary to consider the nature of the proceedings in each of these three cases. Second Appeal No. 387 of 1952 arises out of the suit filed by the landlords of survey Nos. 131 and 132 for obtaining possession of those lands. Survey No. 131 was service inam land, white survey No. 132 was khalsa land. The plaintiffs-landlords contended that defendant No. 1 had executed a kabuliyat, the period of which had expired and that they were, therefore, entitled to the possession of the lands. In answer to this claim, the defendants claimed that defendant No. 1 was a permanent tenant of survey No, 132 and a tenant of antiquity of survey No. 131. The trial Court held defendant No. 1 to be an ordinary tenant in respect of survey No. 132 and a tenant of antiquity in respect of survey No. 131, and the trial Court, therefore, granted the plaintiffs a decree for possession of survey No. 132. The claim in respect of survey No. 131 was dismissed. Both the parties appealed to the District Court. That Court confirmed the finding of the trial Court in regard to survey No. 132 that the tenancy of defendant No. 1 had been lawfully terminated and that his possession was not lawful. The District Court differed from the finding of the trial Court in regard to survey No. 131 and held that defendant No. 1 was an ordinary tenant of this land also. The order made by the trial Court dismissing the claim of the plaintiffs for possession of survey No. 131 was set aside and a decree was granted to the plaintiffs for possession of both the lands, survey Nos. 131 and 132. From this decree, Second Appeal No. 387 of 1952 was preferred to this Court. During the pendency of this appeal, the new Tenancy Act came into force. Certain rights were claimed under this Act before the Division Bench before which the second appeal came up for hearing. As the Division Bench considered that the questions raised were of considerable importance, the matter was referred to the Full Bench.