STATE OF MAHARASHTRA Vs. MAHARASHTRA SUGAR MILLS LTD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) BY a notfn. dated 1-4-1949, the Govt. of Bombay referred an industrial dispute that had arisen between the Maharashtra Sugar Mills, Ltd. , who are regp. 1 before us, and its employees in respect of payment of six months' wages as bonus for the year 1947-48 to all employees including the seasonal and contract labour. This dispute was referred under Section 73, Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946. The company contended before the Tribunal that it had no jurisdiction to arbitrate with reference to the contract labour employed in the industry. That contention was overruled by the Industrial Tribunal. Thereupon a petn. was presented by the company for a writ of certiorari to quash the award made by the Tribunal to the extent that it awarded bonus to contract labour. This petn. came before Bhagwati J. who upheld the contention of the petnr-company and ordered a writ to issue in favour of the company. The State of Bombay has now come in appeal before us from that decision of the learned Judge.

(2.) THE first question that was canvassed before the learned Judge was whether this Ct. had jurisdiction to interfere with the decision of the Industrial Tribunal that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the claim of contract labour in respect of a bonus. The Industrial Tribunal hold that contract labour satisfied the conditions laid down in the Act and those who were employed by contract were employees within the meaning of the Act and therefore, it came to the conclusion that it had jurisdiction to proceed with the reference with regard to contract labour as well. What was urged by the State of Bombay before Bhagwati J. was that the decision of the Industrial Tribunal that contract labourers were employees was a finding of fact which could not be controlled in any way by this Ct. ; that that finding and decision was final and binding and no writ of certiorari could be issued to interfere with that decision. Now the Industrial Court is a Ct. of limited jurisdiction; it is a creature of statute and its jurisdiction is strictly controlled by the Act which brings it into existence, and if the Tribunal acts in excess of the jurisdiction conferred upon it by the statute, the H. C. can always correct the Ct. by an appropriate writ. The jurisdiction of the Ct. to deal with this reference is to be found in Section 78 of the Act, which provides that notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the Provincial Govt. may, at any time, refer an industrial dispute to the arbitration of the Industrial Court, if certain conditions are satisfied with which we are note concerned in this case. Therefore, the only jurisdiction which the Provincial Govt. has is to refer a matter to the Industrial Ct. and the only jurisdiction that the Industrial Ct. has is to try a matter which relates to an industrial dispute as defined by the Act. If something is referred to the Tribunal which is not an industrial dispute, then the Tribunal would have no jurisdiction to deal with that matter. "industrial dispute" is defined by Section 8 (17) as meaning "any dispute or difference between an employer and employee or between employers and employees or between employees and employees and which is connected with any industrial matter", and "industrial matter" is defined by Section 8 (18 ). There is no controversy in this case that the dispute between contract labour and the Sugar Co. is connected with an industrial matter. The only controversy is that the dispute is not between an employer and an employee. The question with regard to jurisdiction arises in this way, that the Industrial Tribunal having decided that there was a relationship of employer and employee between the company and the contract labour; whether it is open to this Ct. to question that finding and to determine for itself whether that finding is a correct one or not. Now, it is well established, and we went into this matter at some length in a recent decision of this Ct. (Mohsinali Mahomedali v. State of Bombay, 53 Bom. L. R. 94 : (A. I. R. (38) 1951 Bom. 30l) that when there is a collateral fact upon the determination of which the jurisdiction of a Tribunal arises, if the Tribunal decides the collateral fact erroneously and assumes jurisdiction, the superior Ct. can always correct the decision of the inferior Ct. It must be a fact which it is necessary to decide in order to assume jurisdiction; or in other words, the jurisdiction of the Ct. must be conditional upon the existence of that fact. In contradistinction to such collateral facts there are relevant facts or facts in issue which the Ct. has been created in order to determine. Express jurisdiction has been conferred upon the Ct. to decide and determine those facts, and as far as the determination of those facts is concerned, the decision of the Ct. is final and however erroneous its decision may be in fact or in law, the superior Ct. will not interfere with that decision. Therefore, what has got to be considered in this case is, whether the question as to the relationship between the company and the contract labour and as to whether that relationship was that of employer and employee is a collateral fact or a relevant fact which the Ob, had to determine as required by statute. In our opinion Bhagwati J. was quite right when he came to the conclusion that the very jurisdiction of the Tribunal depended upon the matter which it was determining being an industrial dispute. If it was not an industrial dispute, then the Ct. has no jurisdiction to decide the matter, and in order to decide whether it was an industrial dispute or not, the Tribunal had, in the first instance and in limine, to determine whether the relationship between the company and the contract labour was that of employer and employee or not. It was only on the determination of this issue that the Ct. could either have jurisdiction or no jurisdiction to determine the matter. Therefore, the existence of an industrial dispute was the very foundation of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to decide this matter. Therefore, it is clear that the Tribunal could not assume to itself jurisdiction to decide this question by erroneously finding that the relationship between the company and contract labour was that of employer and employee. If that determination was wrong, the superior Ct. could certainly interfere and correct the lower Ct. as far as the determination of this particular issue was concerned. Therefore, there can be no question that this Ct. has ample jurisdiction to consider whether the finding of the Tribunal that the relationship between the company and contract labour was that of employer and employee was right or not. The only substantial point that has been argued before us by both Mr. K. T. Desai on behalf of the State and by Mr. M. V. Desai on behalf of the company is whether the decision of the Tribunal that the contract labour were employees and that the company were employers is a correct decision.

(3.) NOW, the Act defines both an employer and an employee, and the definition, as I shall presently point out, is an artificial definition. In our opinion, it is entirely unnecessary to consider what the incidents of the relationship between master and servant are according to common law in England. Whatever those incidents may be, in this particular case we are only concerned with the narrow question as to whether contract labour engaged in this sugar industry falls within the definition of employee used by the Legislature and the Sugar Co. falls within the definition of employer, also used by the Legislature. If the definition is satisfied, then even though according to common law the relationship between the contract labour and the company may not be that of master and servant, still they would be employer and employee for the purpose of the statute, and if they are employer and employee for the purpose of the statute, then the dispute between them would be an industrial dispute which would be referable to the Tribunal and which the Tribunal would have jurisdiction to determine.