LAWS(BOM)-1950-4-9

W H KING Vs. EMPEROR

Decided On April 10, 1950
W.H.KING Appellant
V/S
EMPEROR Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an application for a certificate under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution of India. The petitioner was prosecuted in the Court of the Presidency Magistrate, 19th Court, Bombay, for offences under Section 18(1) and Section 19(2), Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act (Bom. Act LVII [57] of 1947). At the trial a charge was framed against him under both the aforesaid sections. The learned Magistrate hold that on the facts proved the petitioner was guilty of the offence under Section 19(2) of the said Act. He accordingly convicted him of the said offence and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for a day and to pay a fine of Rs. 30,000. In default he was ordered to undergo simple imprisonment for six weeks. Against this order of conviction and sentence the petitioner preferred an appeal to this Court, but the said appeal was summarily dismissed on 20th February 1950. The petitioner now wants a certificate under Article 134(1)(c) that his case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court.

(2.) The facts alleged against the accused are not disputed before us, but it is argued by Mr. Dalal that the question which he proposes to raise in his appeal before the Supreme Court is whether on the facts proved the petitioner could be said to have committed the offence under Section 19(2). Mr. Dalal's argument is that his client cannot be said to have relinquished his tenancy in favour of the complainant, because the word 'relinquishment' must necessarily mean surrender of the tenancy in favour of the landlord; and since the prosecution case is that the tenancy was surrendered is favour of a stranger by the accused, he could not be said to have relinquished his tenancy and as such no offence under Section 19(2) can be said to have been proved in this case. Mr. Dalal contends that this is a matter of the construction of Section 19 of Bombay Act LVII [57] of 1947 and his case can therefore be certified to be a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court. Mr. Dalai has also mentioned that there are two other points which he seeks to raise in this appeal. He argues that Section 4(1) applies to the premises in question and as such he could not be said to be guilty under Section 19 even if it is held that he has relinquished his tenancy to the complainant after accepting consideration. There is no substance whatever in this point because it is clear that the premises in question do not fall under the protection of Section 4(1) of the Act. Mr. Dalal has also suggested that though it may be illegal to accept consideration for relinquishment validly made by the tenant, it would be no offence to accept such consideration for relinquishment which is contrary to law. We have no doubt that this argument also is without any substance. The question which, therefore, falls to be decided in this case is whether we would be justified in granting a certificate under Article 134(1)(c) because a point is raised as to the construction Section 19 of Bombay Act LVII [57] of 1947. It is no doubt a question of law, and if a certificate could properly be granted under Article 134(1)(c) if a point of law arises in the appeal, Mr. Dalal would clearly be entitled to such a certificate.

(3.) The appellate powers of the Supreme Court are dealt with in Articles 132 to 136 of the Constitution of India. Article 132 confers appellate jurisdiction on the Supreme Court in civil, criminal or other proceedings where the case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution itself. Article 133 deals with appeals in civil matters and it corresponds with Sections 109 and 110, Civil P. C. except for the enhancement of the amount of RS. 10,000 to Rs. 20,000. Article 134 relates to criminal matters. Article 135 saves the jurisdiction and powers which were being exercised by the Federal Court immediately before the commencement of the Constitution, while Article 136 gives jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in its discretion to grant special leave to appeal in cases decided by any Court or tribunal in the territory of India. This last article confers wide appellate powers on the Supreme Court and in due course the Supreme Court may have to lay down the principles which it would apply in exercising its discretion under this articles. In the present case we are concerned with Article 184(1)(c) under which the petitioner claims a certificate from us.